THE NEW REPUBLIC

Crusade for Trade

Oscar Gass

Which Revolution for Brazil?

Louis Wiznitzer

Catholics and School Aid

Christopher Jencks

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Irving Howe

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

The Coach and the Professor

★ The tension became almost unbearable as we waited in the marble Senate Caucus room for Francis Gary Powers to arrive. The doors burst open and, in one of the finest pieces of theater we have ever seen, a shouting scrimmage of cameramen backed in like the farmers at Concord, shooting, retreating and firing again. Center of the commotion was a calm young man fresh from Soviet prison and CIA hideaway, who wrecked a Summit, colored a campaign and shook the world.

It was one of those games of psychic reporting where you try to guess what a man is thinking rather than what he is saying. In a diffident monotone Powers told of bailing out of a hurtling U-2 plane, fighting G-forces and landing inside Russia. He spoke in the even, level voice of somebody testifying in police court. The huge audience didn't know whether it thought Powers a hero or a heel. Senators made no doubt they were out to rehabilitate him; they would have done better if they hadn't been so obvious about it. They left an impression that much remained untold.

So there was Powers – floating down inside Russia with a do-it-yourself CIA spy kit, dagger, pistol & silencer, wad of rubles, poison needle and all – and instead of a figure of romance he turned out to be a kind of highly paid chauffeur flying an IBM espionage machine.

The CIA keeps on repeating that Powers lived up to his "contract." This seems to put the thing in perspective. He appears to be an uncomplicated, unimaginative chap whom the Russians treated with surprising kindness; maybe they hadn't met many like him before. He shared his prison cell with a Latvian but never thought to ask him much about Russia; not interested.

Now Powers is back the CIA suddenly acknowledges it advised downed pilots to "adopt a cooperative attitude" toward captors and "to tell the truth about their mission." Why didn't they say this before? We won't ascribe motives but with Powers back and this contract in his pocket we imagine he could have sued the government for his two years' back $50,000, and could have collected it, too.

Powers, we learn, got $2,000 a month; astronaut John Glenn $800 a month. There is nothing odd in that, of course; the football coach always gets more than the Greek professor.

Another good drama in Washington last week: the long day in the House of Representatives when the deal to add three new members collapsed. It was a nice little deal to raise the size of the House to 438 and give Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Missouri each a seat, and the bottom dropped out when the leader got fighting over the spoils.

We felt sorry for House Speaker McCormack, humiliated as the untried new leader by the collapse of a maneuver which he helped engineer. He is tall, slim, sallow; 70 years old, and likeable as are most old-time Boston Irish politicians. He dresses in black and looks like a sympathetic undertaker. What an extraordinarily negative system of government it is, to be sure, that puts a provincial like this in the third top job in the line of succession in Washington!

The Grid

★ Federal Power Commission Chairman Swidler says power plants are getting bigger and transmission lines longer and it's going to revolutionize our lives. Big cities won't need reeking power stations contaminating the air from their smoking chimneys; the coal will be converted right at West Virginia or Pennsylvania coal mines and brought into the clean cities over the looped wires. That isn't all, either. If he has his way we're going to have The Grid, making us one nation in power distribution. Then we shall look back in wonder at quaint 1962 and compare it to a century ago when little railways began groping their way toward a national system.

For some reason which laymen can't understand a 500 kv power line carries almost five times as much power as a 230 kv line, and pretty soon we're going to have 1,000 kv lines. Instead of sending power 200 miles we'll send it across singing wires 1,000 or 1,500 miles. (Russia is sending power 1,500 miles from Bratsk to the Urals.) Two advantages, among others: Tied into a Grid power companies which now keep 15 percent reserve power for emergencies can reduce it to 10 percent; a saving at expected 1980 rates of production, Swidler says, of $3 billion a year. And with a Grid power can follow the sun across the continent, time zone by time zone, easing off in New York as lights switch on in Los Angeles.

No Trespassing

★ We can agonize about the Summit but it seems terribly distant. The state of Virginia is closer. Maybe we can do something here. This is the third year that Prince Edward County's public schools have been closed down – shut – rather than integrate. The Virginia Supreme Court calls this legal. Whites go to private schools; 1,700 Negroes in darkest America get some little help from heroic volunteers. What can we do to save civilization in Virginia? It couldn't happen in Russia! It is an educational lynching. The saddest words we know are those that have been nailed on an American public school in Harry Byrd's Commonwealth of Virginia – "No Trespassing."

Religious fanatics faked the anti-Jewish "Protocols of Zion." A minister linked Washington to the cherry tree. Another minister, the Rev. William Boetcker of Erie, Penna., liberated "Lincoln" fakes 30 years ago ("You cannot help the poor by destroying the rich," etc.) which keep bobbing up in commercial house organs. Now Senator Metcalf (D, Mont.) exposes a "Khrushchev" fake, supposedly saying he would turn America Red by electing leaders offering "small doses of socialism." It's a pure phony and Rightist leaders love it.

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LeMay's Last Stand

The great debate in Washington one week before the opening of the 18-nation disarmament conference was about whether the Pentagon could be "directed, ordered, mandated and required" by Congress, and specifically the House Armed Services Committee, to pour another $491 million into the development of a reconnaissance bomber, the B-70, that is now no more than a gleam in the eye of the Air Force. To the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, 78-year-old Carl Vinson, *amour-propre* is involved. The power of his Committee to determine what goes into the defense arsenal has diminished, and he querulously asks whether Congress is to be "just Mr. Moneybags, to give or to withhold funds?" Mr. Vinson doesn't want to "run" the Defense Department, just "get across an idea once in a while." If he succeeds in forcing the President to follow his "directive," the gates of Washington will be thrown open wider to other camp followers of what President Eisenhower called the "military-industrial complex." The selection of new weapons systems and military projects will provide the occasion for giant promotion efforts that will dwarf the present drum-beating. Public relations men, promoters, contractors and crackpots of every description will spare no effort to win Congressional votes for a bagful of projects whose home-state emotional and financial appeal may exceed their military value.

Secretary of Defense McNamara has warned that the Air Force plan to produce the B-70 in quantity would be a "serious waste of the nation's resources." His proposal to spend only $180 million (as against $491 million) to develop three prototypes, rather than going into full production, is such evident good management one wonders how it can be challenged. The B-70 has already devoured more than a billion dollars of government funds without the plane's having flown, and the Secretary estimates that if the Air Chief of Staff, General Curtis LeMay, has his way, it would ultimately require a total commitment of $10 billion. This is a high price to pay for a weapon which by the time it becomes operational (if it does, in 1970 or 1971) may be less effective than intercontinental ballistic missiles for nuclear strikes at distant targets.

When Mr. McNamara's objections seemed to jeopardize the project, the Air Force renamed its project overnight. The B-70 became the RS-70, a "reconnaissance strike" bomber. The Air Force claimed that it could double as a flying installation for "side-view" radar, and as an airborne launcher of nuclear air to ground missiles. The President and

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his aides quickly pointed out no such equipment exists.

The utility of any such high-flying, high-speed reconnaissance bomber is zero, *unless* it were used as part of a massive, nuclear missile attack – an attack which destroyed substantially Soviet detection and defense devices. It is no good unless enemy radar has first been eliminated; and then it is useful only if it can do things missiles can't do – that is, find and destroy essential targets missiles can't reach. And no one knows that it can. A Soviet rocket that could intercept the U-2, a long-winged, short-bodied plane designed to soar the thin air of the upper atmosphere, could certainly reach a larger plane like the B-70. Although the B-70 would be much faster than the U-2 (2,500 miles per hour compared with about 550), it would be no match for a missile, which flashes toward its target at much higher velocity. No match, to repeat, unless enemy radar and communications had already been paralyzed.

Both the US and the USSR now probably possess excellent guidance systems that enable an anti-aircraft missile to "home in" on the infrafred radiation (heat) given off by a plane's jet engines. Heat-seeking missiles need only to be fired in the general direction of the target plane (usually by ground-based radar); their infrared sensors and internal guidance systems then steer them directly into the plane's engines. Small errors in guidance are unimportant, for the missiles contain proximity fuses that explode them as soon as the signal received by the sensors begins to fade. The swiftness and sureness with which the infrared-guided missiles make their "kills" was demonstrated not only in the case of the U-2, but also in a US Air Force training accident last spring, when a four-engine B-52 jet bomber was blown apart and its crew killed by an infrared-guided missile unintentionally fired from a nearby fighter plane.

Air defense strategists estimate that in the event of a massive strike against the US by enemy bombers, US anti-aircraft missiles would destroy 95 percent of the planes before they reached their targets. Without access to classified intelligence reports, the public cannot assume that Soviet anti-aircraft missiles could not similarly annihilate an attacking force of B-70's; again, one must add, *unless* they were used to follow up a debilitating ICBM attack.

The Strategic Air Command pointed out during the B-70 campaign it waged in Congress and in the press last year that "it would cost the Soviets $40 billion to operate their defense to a point where they could compete with a fleet of B-70's." This was offered as an argument for going ahead full speed on B-70 production. How sound is the argument? All evidence suggests that the Soviets have not tried to outmatch us in long-range delivery devices, that they do not have a first-strike capability. Is it in our interests to encourage them to create one? Even if they do not now take seriously the possibility of a pre-emptive war launched by the US, there would be reason for them to reconsider once they see us going beyond Polaris, hardened missiles and the rest of our deterrent arsenal to this new, destabilizing offensive weapon; a weapon, moreover, which, because it is land-based, is highly vulnerable if it is struck first.

General LeMay has not explained how the B-70, which could have an important role in a first-strike strategy, is necessary or desirable for a strategy seeking only to deter a Soviet military attack.

College Scholarships

The Administration wants $2.67 billion to be spent over the next five years on higher education. Of this, $300 million a year would be loaned to colleges for building classrooms (the Housing and Home Finance Agency is already authorized to lend money for building dormitories); another $50 million a year would go into grants to two year "community colleges"; the remaining $920 million would provide 212,500 needy college undergraduates with four year scholarships (the National Defense Education Act already provides them with loans, half of which are cancellable if the recipient enters teaching).

The Senate has approved the Administration's request virtually intact; the House has eliminated the scholarships and tried to make up for it by turning part of the construction loans into grants. The House Rules Committee permitting, the bill now goes to conference where some compromise may be negotiated, but in all probability one which excludes scholarships.

However, the case for scholarships is stronger than the case for loans. New buildings are, by and large, easier to finance than what happens inside them. Alumni eager to see their names perpetuated – or alumni widows eager to see their husband's names enshrined – are readier to build monuments than to endow chairs. Unlike money for monuments, money for scholarships is hard to come by except in rich private colleges. The great virtue of this form of aid is that instead of forcing a government agency to decide which colleges shall profit by federal subsidy, the scholarship system makes this the cumulative result of thousands of students' individual decisions. It also avoids the difficult question of aid to church colleges, by aiding individual students. Perhaps most important, it gives the individual student a feeling that his education is costing a large amount of money, and that he ought to be using the opportunities offered him to the full. This is far better than providing the money directly to the institution and then making admission free, for then the

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undergraduate is likely to feel that college education is a right rather than a privilege, something he can take or leave as the spirit moves him from day to day.

But if the Senate-House conference committee cannot agree on scholarships, why might it not compromise on an approved loan program? The hitch with loans at present is that they have to be paid back too soon, and that repayment is not scaled to later income. Perhaps instead of pro rata repayments, the legislators might consider tying the loans to adult income tax payments. Under one scheme, often discussed although never tried, if a pupil were loaned $5,000 over four years, he would agree to add five percent to his annual income tax payments in later life. If he then entered school teaching, and wound up only paying $1,000 or so a year in taxes, his repayments would be relatively slight. If, on the other hand, he entered corporation law and was paying, say, $20,000 a year in taxes, he would be helping to finance the careers of less well paid classmates. In the long run such a scheme could entirely eliminate ability to pay as a factor in college attendance, without costing the Treasury a dollar.

Pilot Powers–All Clear

"It was hominy all the way," Wallace Carroll observed in the *New York Times* concerning the Senate Armed Services Committee's hearing on Francis Gary Powers' misadventures in a U-2 over Sverdlovsk. Hominy is the traditional substance of a Southern breakfast, and its sound approximates a Dixie rendition of *harmony*. Georgia's Senator Richard B. Russell, chairman, set the theme by announcing "fair play for Mr. Powers," who is a Virginian, by the way. In the distracted days of May two years ago, with the government entangled in its own fabrications, one could scarcely believe anything and so was tempted to credit everything. Nikita Khrushchev, pressing all opportunities to compound confusion, attributed a fault of duty to Powers ("everything alive wants to live"), a purposeful failure to destroy his craft, motivated by suspicion that his superiors had had the relevant lever wired to accomplish the destruction of the flier as well. Even so careful a reporter as Hanson Baldwin accepted and repeated the dark allegation.

Some vindication appeared to be due the now liberated and repatriated pilot, who, it appears, kept his head throughout the ordeal, never forgetting, as he told the Senate committee, that he is an American. He got it handsomely – first from an investigatory panel set up by his sponsor, the CIA, and second by the hospitable Senators. The supply of rehabilitation was copious, exceeding even Pilot Powers' needs, and the CIA itself carried home a free bucketful from the feast.

Footnotes *of the* Week

DOUBTS about John McCormack's leadership hardened when the Speaker, by prematurely surrendering publicly on the Urban Affairs bill, turned defeat into disaster. Then, last week, he blew up completely and disavowed his own bill to add three members to the House. The priority items left on his list are: trade and tariff revision, aid to higher education, medical care for the aged. The White House adds another – tax revision. *IS 'THE BEAT' fading? Two radio stations in New York City have dropped rock 'n roll, and ABC-TV is slicing the Dick Clark rock 'n roll party from 60 to 30 minutes to carry a five-time a week late afternoon children's program: a minor triumph for Newton Minow.* LOQUACIOUS Sen. Everett Dirksen, who trailed Ike in '56 by half a million votes in Illinois, may lose his seat to liberal Chicagoan Sidney Yates, now serving his seventh term in the House. Mayor Daley predicts Cook County will give Democrat Yates close to the 456,000 margin it gave Kennedy; he's sure of it if Dirksen and Halleck continue their Ev and Charlie Show until November. *THE ADMINISTRATION hopes to send Congress by mid-March a legislative package on transportation – railroads, airlines and urban mass transit. If the deadline can't be met, the mass transit portion may be lifted out and sent with a request for statutory spending authority over a three to four-year period to aid cities.* NIXON has united California's quarreling Democrats and split the GOP, as shown by the California Republican Assembly's rejection of a Nixon-sponsored condemnation of the John Birch Society. Leader of the bitter fight to water down the censure resolution was former Nixon manager, Murray Chotiner. *THE FARM SECURITY Administration photographs of the face of America in the 30's was the New Deal's most successful venture in the arts. Stacked away since 1939 in the Library of Congress, they will be displayed in October at the Museum of Modern Art in a major exhibition arranged by Edward Steichen.* PAKISTAN'S new Constitution enfranchises 80,000 people in a country of 90 million. For parliamentary democracy to work, said General Ayub Khan, "you need a really cool and phlegmatic temperament, which only people living in cold climates seem to have." *PROSPECTS for the proposed $100 million United Nations bond purchase are uncertain. Estimates last week assigned a firm minimum of 47 votes for Senator Aiken's substitute authorizing a short-term loan to bail out the UN temporarily and provide more time for bearing down on UN member nations lagging on assessments. Whatever Congress decides, the UN may receive a substantial grant from a private American foundation.*

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Menon Riding High

"India is naturally inclined toward the West," said V. K. Krishna Menon in the first flush of his landslide election victory in North Bombay. "We are a free democracy and capitalistic, which makes us more akin to the Western powers than the Red bloc." Safely returned to his seat in Parliament and more powerfully situated than ever in the factional struggles of the Nehru regime, India's Defense Minister could afford a few magnanimous words of reassurance for critics in the West who had been cheering on his unsuccessful opponent, J. B. Kripalani.

Mr. Krishna Menon's principal Cabinet antagonist, Finance Minister Morarji Desai, was losing political ground in his home state of Gujarat while Menon was winning in Bombay; though Desai won a new term in Parliament, his Gujarat rivals have now consolidated their position in state Congress Party affairs, and Desai will no longer carry great weight in New Delhi. In the Cabinet reshuffle that is expected within the next several months, Desai will probably be transferred from Finance to the Home Ministry to make way for a successor less identified with rightist doubts about Nehru's foreign and domestic policies.

The fact that the Indian Communists embraced the Krishna Menon candidacy and exploited the anti-Nehru tenor of the Kripalani campaign to proclaim a nationwide "popular front" of Communist and Congress Left elements may prove more significant in the long run than the improvement in Menon's personal fortunes. Nominal Communist strength remained more or less constant: a drop from 30 to 29 seats in Parliament (as against 353 for the Congress) and an increase from 129 to 153 seats in state legislatures (the most significant increases centered in the Party strongholds of Andhra, Kerala and Bengal). But in addition to running their own slates, the Communists also covertly backed certain Congress "progressives" and an undisclosed number of the 400-odd disgruntled Congress partisans who failed to win nomination and ran for state assembly seats as independents. One of the more interesting indicators in Indian politics in the years immediately ahead will be the extent and success of the Communist attempt to infiltrate the ruling party and the cooperation received from opportunistic Congress personalities such as Menon and Oil Minister K. D. Malaviya. Conceivably, if the attempt does not seem to be paying off, Party militants advocating insurrectionist guerrilla tactics will gain the upperhand in the internal doctrinal dispute which has intensified since the death of general secretary Ajoy Ghosh.

THE ARREST OF 700 NEGROES FOR "PARADING WITHOUT PERMISSION"

Trial of a Small Town

Albany, Georgia

This sprightly, but mannerly and basically well-meaning south Georgia city has lately attained an undesired and at least partially undeserved national reputation as the prototype of all the relics of the Middle Ages that are stubbornly refusing to surrender to the 20th Century. This is the result of the arrests of 700 Negroes, including the Rev. Martin Luther King, on the technical charge of parading without a license in a demonstration against segregated seating on the city bus lines. But the reputation is fantastically wrong. Albany is simply a community that has a wolf by the ears and cannot discover any safe way of letting go. A political cabalist who could come up with a formula that would save face on both sides might be publicly repudiated but would be privately welcomed by both sides.

The misadventure of white Albany was its encounter with Negro leadership with a sense of humor. The arrests prove it. They have been characterized by a politeness that reduced the whole operation to farce. The train of incidents started last autumn when large numbers of Negroes, many of them students at Albany State College, a Negro unit of the University of Georgia, came into the local bus station, the students being those who were leaving for a holiday weekend. They overflowed into the white section, whereupon the police officer on duty directed them to leave and they refused to leave. There is no evidence that the officer was tough about it, and none that the refusal was anything but polite, although firm.

In the circumstances the plain duty of the officer was to arrest the ringleader and make a test case. Accordingly, he said to one, "You are under arrest," and immediately found himself with 197 prisoners; they came quietly, but they overflowed the police station and gummed up the works when it came to booking them and posting cash bonds. Police headquarters was

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overworked for hours, handling the flood. So it happened, again and again. Whenever a policeman undertook to arrest one Negro – the charge was always trespass – 50 to 150 surrendered. Eventually the total reached 700.

The Rev. Martin Luther King did not enter the situation until toward the end of the year. Up to that point direction of affairs had been in the hands of a more or less informal organization calling itself the Albany Movement. But in November Mr. King, after addressing a rally at a local church, invited the audience to accompany him to the City Hall where the Commissioners were in session. On the way the Chief of Police arrested him for violating a city ordinance that forbids a traffic-blocking parade without a special permit.

King's defense is that he was not parading, he was merely exercising the constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition for redress of grievances. The police charge is that, be that as it may, his crowd overflowed the sidewalk and spilled into the street to the interruption of traffic, and that constitutes a parade. So joined, the issues went to court.

After bond was posted, defense counsel informed the court that the date fixed for the hearing conflicted with Mr. King's speaking engagements in various parts of the country, and was assured by the court that that was all right, the hearing would be postponed to suit the defendant's convenience. It was postponed more than once, but on February 27 it came to trial. Lawyers on both sides stipulated that the evidence as regards King would be accepted as applying to the other cases, eliminating the necessity of 700 separate trials. One witness, the Chief of Police, was heard; he testified that he had made the arrest at the hour and date specified, after which the court declared a recess of 30 days to permit the lawyers to submit briefs, and claimed another 30 days in which to consider them, after which it would render judgment. And there the cases stand at present.

Obviously, Albany is resolved not to make a martyr of the Rev. Mr. King, nor is there evident any disposition to wreak vengeance on his followers. Alarmists had predicted all sorts of disturbances at the time of the trial, but nothing happened. The 699 were represented by counsel, only King appearing in court; and inquiring reporters discovered only the usual dozen or so loafers hanging around the courtroom. For the rest, Albany, white and black, attended strictly to business on that day. So much for the heart of darkness, the fortress of feudalism.

Nevertheless, to discount the seriousness of the situation would be a grave error. The calm that prevails in Albany is due entirely to the rigid control that leadership on both sides has thus far been able to impose upon the rank and file. The one point of agreement has been that violence will not be tolerated; but Negro leadership has not been content to rely on demonstrations, however peaceful, or on legal proceedings. It has resorted to the extra-legal procedure of an economic boycott that has already wrecked the bus company and is seriously affecting half the mercantile interests of the town. Negro domestics are still at work, but they are transported to their jobs by car pools. Negro retail trade is going in part to Negro stores and in part, through car pools, to stores in surrounding towns. Negroes constitute about half the population, but they account for no more than a quarter of retail business; but a reduction of that amount is enough to throw many establishments into the red.

Yet the economic loss to the Negroes too is considerable and the psychological strain is worse. That they have produced an effect is undeniable; but how much longer can they hold out? Until they have obtained their objectives? Nobody knows.

The announced objectives are really inconsiderable. Most of them the whites are willing to grant, and as to the others it is hard to believe that the Negroes care much. The original demands were three – no segregation in city buses; employment of Negroes as drivers and certain other jobs; no segregation in the intercity bus station. To all these the bus company and the City Commission agreed; but then the Negroes demanded dismissal of the charges against the demonstrators and return of the cash bonds posted, matters within the purview of the courts, not of the City Commission. On that demand negotiations stalled and the boycott continues. The argument of the whites is that they made concessions, whereupon the Negroes promptly increased their demands. Would not further concessions produce further demands beyond all bearable limits? The argument of the Negroes is that they gained their present advantage with enormous difficulty and at heavy cost; if they fail to exploit it, will such an opportunity ever come again? Possibly both are right; an outsider cannot tell.

But an outsider can perceive the deadly danger in the situation, for in the background is a third force that neither side cares to discuss. It is the irresponsible element in both races, held in check thus far, but for how much longer? Albany is for the Negroes a college town, for the whites a military town, with the great Air Force Base of Turner Field, and the still greater Marine Supply Base. Both factors make for discipline and order; but there is a vast hinterland not affected by either, backwaters prolific of tough Negroes and tougher whites. Let these once get out of control, and all that the damyankees have said falsely of Albany will come suddenly and horribly true.

Oh, yes, it is a civilized town; but it has a wolf by the ears.

Gerald W. Johnson

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WHY WEST GERMANY'S AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW IS BEING RECALLED

What Does Herr Kroll Want?

An episode in West German diplomatic history has occurred which has an indirect but immensely significant bearing on Soviet policies in Germany, and in particular on Soviet support of Walter Ulbricht in East Berlin. The episode concerns Hans Kroll, who is soon to be replaced as the West German Ambassador in Moscow.

First a word on the career and character of Dr. Kroll. He was born in East German Silesia and has always been fascinated by Russia and Russian affairs. He was a career diplomat and served in a half a dozen embassies before the War. He was West German Ambassador to Belgrade from 1953 to 1955, to Tokyo from 1955 to 1958, and to Moscow during the past four years. He is a man of rough but ready wit, immense energy and ambition, and an ingrained belief in the efficacy of his own ideas. His mixture of geniality and rudeness has appealed to Khrushchev.

In November Dr. Kroll was recalled to Bonn because he was alleged to have propagated some heretical plans for settling the German problem. It turned out that a foreign newspaperman had betrayed a confidence of his, and that this related in any case to ideas which belonged to Khrushchev and not to Kroll. In December – Kroll's vindication by the Foreign Office notwithstanding – the newspaper *Die Welt* launched fresh charges against him. In January the same paper predicted his early retirement, on the grounds that he had suffered a series of heart attacks (this seems to have been quite untrue). In February *Die Welt* was again on his trail, stating that the ambassador wanted a Russo-German agreement "whatever it might cost."

He has denied that he proposed concessions in return for a Soviet guarantee of West Berlin's freedom and independence, concessions which included the recognition of the East German Republic and the Oder-Neisse Line as Germany's final eastern frontier, as well as a $2,500 million loan to the Soviet Union. He has stated publicly that he wants better Russo-German relations, but on a basis of Berlin's freedom, better living conditions for the people of Eastern Germany, and no writing-off of the German people's right to self-determination and unity. In the course of his explanations Kroll used some remarkably undiplomatic language (the words "liar," "intriguer," "slanderer," and "poisoner of the wells" constantly recurred). Dr. Adenauer was especially incensed by these verbal fireworks.

It will be supremely difficult to piece together just what Kroll may have said, in casual conversation much more than in diplomatic exchanges. What is of more immediate importance is the effect in Western Germany of what he is *believed* to have said – that a Soviet guarantee of West Berlin might be "traded" for recognition of the East German Republic and the Oder-Neisse Line. This alleged "Kroll plan" has incurred him the violent opposition of the refugee groups, of some leading industrialists, of influential members of the Foreign Office and the Christian Democratic Party, and of *Springer-Verlag*, the most important newspaper publishing house in Germany.

The anger of a great many Germans is understandable. But it has led to curiosities and anomalies. On March 5, Chancellor Adenauer had to give the refugee groups his personal assurance that Germany's eastern frontiers will only be settled at an all-German peace treaty. *Die Welt* quoted the government as reaffirming the "Hallstein Doctrine" – that the Federal Republic will neither recognize the East German Republic nor have any relations with any other country that does so. The government press produced the misleading explanation that Kroll was in trouble because he was working against the interests of the Federal Republic's Western allies. This was misleading because the mass of Americans and British probably reckon that recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line and of the East German Republic would not be too high a price to pay for a guarantee of West Berlin's freedom.

This is the point where the "Kroll crisis" is related to the power and position of Ulbricht. In striving continuously for a better Russo-German understanding, Kroll has always had to make clear that the Federal Republic – given a reduction of tension between East and West – can be a worthwhile friend and trading partner of the USSR, in contrast to the eternally rickety East German Republic. Here is a notion which must be brought home to Khrushchev's mind, for this is the only way in which Russian agreement to a fair and lasting solution of the German problem can be gained. Kroll was not looking for a "second Rapallo," a Russo-German agreement at the expense of the West, but for an interim settlement in Central Europe which can reduce the threat of war. This is precisely what his West German opponents are not going to allow him to do, and this is the primary reason why Walter Ulbricht will continue to be utterly indispensable to Khrushchev.

Terence Prittie

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KENNEDY'S "BOLD NEW PROGRAM"

A very high priority has been assigned by the Administration to its Trade Liberalization Bill, hearings on which opened March 12 before the House Ways and Means Committee, under the Chairmanship of Wilbur Mills. Best informed speculation as of this writing is that although Mr. Mills will do his best to assure the adoption of some legislation, it may not be precisely the legislation the White House wants. In this first installment of a two-part essay, Mr. Gass deals with the economic aspect of the trade debate. He will complete this discussion in a second article next week dealing with the political issues that are raised by the President's new program.

The Crusade for Trade

I. The New Frontier's Economic Wager

by Oscar Gass

Consequently I rejoice, having to construct something upon which to rejoice. T. S. ELIOT

Many Americans are hungry in 1962 for some public cause which both engages sympathy and satisfies intellect. And they prefer to take their stand for the Right and the Good, in respected company and at a reasonable price. For these people, Trade Liberalization is the dish of the day. The menu description is attractive and the company grand. (Indeed, it would, I think, not be unfair to describe Trade Liberalization as *the* cause of the American Establishment in 1962.) Yet, I fear, many now so attracted by the menu and the company will, one day, rise from the table, shame-faced, still self-consciously hungry and feeling they have been deceived. The dish is being wildly over-advertised.

The gains from international exchanges are indeed great – not easily measured or even delimited. To travel from New York to Rome is not some multiple of traveling from New York to San Francisco. And we cannot, as a nation, pay our way to Rome unless we have some international earnings. Nobody has computed what it would cost to raise coffee in the United States or even to supply domestically all our needs of pulp, newsprint and paper. Nobody *can* compute the gain to the efficiency of our economy and to its innovating drive from the challenge, in our markets, of foreign competitive suppliers. Without international earnings, we could give or lend to less-developed countries only American products. We could not pay for any activity abroad. And are we to forget the obligations of world citizenship? The import purchase which is comparatively indifferent to us may mean a great deal to the foreign seller.

But let us not give combat so that virtue may triumph over imaginary ogres. The issues before the American people in 1962 are not so wide as the gains from international exchange. Nobody is suggesting that international trade be eliminated or even reduced in any drastic way. The real issues are both narrower and more troublesome. First, is the economic gain to the American economy, from further lowering of our customs duties, likely to be large? This may be questioned. Second, will it be easier for the United States to maintain full employment in an economy in which international trade is more important? The contrary seems more likely. Third, would Trade Liberalization mean a great step forward in closer and more sympathetic working relations with the more advanced non-Communist countries? This I doubt. Fourth, will the American initiative in Trade Liberalization be of aid to the less-developed countries? This depends on how the initiative is worked out. Fifth, is it perhaps realistic, therefore, to regard the American program of Trade Liberalization not only as an *initiative* toward more open markets but equally as a *reaction* to the discriminatory closing of Western European markets against American imports? In this, there appears to be much truth. Sixth, does the Trade Liberalization pro-

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gram advanced by President Kennedy provide adequate standards and sound criteria of action? Are its proposed delegations of power to the President in accordance with the responsible conduct of American government? These things I would question.

The Character of American Imports

In 1959-61, United States imports of merchandise averaged about $15 billion annually. This is barely 3 percent of Gross National Product. For Great Britain, the corresponding figure is about 15 percent. Yet, such is the ascendancy of British economics over the American mind, that much of what Americans write about international trade reads as if it were counsel addressed to a British Chancellor of the Exchequer. (Intellectually, the ascendancy is justified. We have not from an American hand anything comparable to *The Theory of International Economic Policy*, by J. E. Meade.)

In the bad old days of the late 1920's, when United States tariffs were greatly higher, our imports were also more important – about 5 percent of Gross National Product. Many things the United States buys abroad have become relatively cheaper; synthetic substitutes have been developed for some imports; and the range of American manufacturing has broadened greatly. From a merely American point of view, and a merely economic one, the potential gain from free international trade is correspondingly less important.

American imports declined in importance while tariffs were being reduced. In 1926-30 our duties averaged 13.7 percent of *all* imports. But in ten of the last fifteen years, our duties have averaged 6 percent or lower. Even when duty is related to *dutiable* imports alone, United States customs duties have never averaged above 12.7 percent in any year of the last eleven. This contrasts with 40 percent in 1926-30. In a world of quotas and buying discriminations, customs reductions are not an exact guide, but they do reflect a gross change.

The most striking decline, in economic weight, has been in just those articles where we charge no customs duty at all. For about ten years now, some $6 billion of United States imports have been free of any duty. In this decade, the dollar total of our Gross National Product has increased from a range of $330 billion to $520 billion, but these customs-free imports have continued to hover around $6 billion a year, without any rising trend.

A further reduction in United States tariffs would have impact initially through the $9 billion of imports which do pay some duty. And it would affect also other items which do not come in at all because our duty is prohibitive. Consider: what might result, at best, from the *total* elimination of duties on all our dutiable imports? Let us allow, as best we can, for those entrepreneurs who will be invigorated – and for those who will be killed. At how much lower cost might we then be able to buy these $9 billion of imports and also the other items now excluded? (Our exports are, of course, our means of paying for our imports.) Is it likely that, as a nation, we would save $5 billion a year, in any year of the 1960's, as the result of buying abroad more cheaply – and more? As costs go down, real incomes are enlarged. Yet a gain of $5 billion looks like a saving of over 50 percent derived principally from additional trading in our presently dutiable imports, now valued at $9 billion. Is such a $5 billion gain likely? If the answer is in the affirmative – if we would save $5 billion annually – our economic gain would be somewhat under 1 percent of our annual Gross National Product. Is a gain of the order of 1 percent what is now being advertised? Is this the bold new road to the future of the American economy?

The potential economic gain to the United States from further trade liberalization is the smaller because we already admit either duty-free or with very low duties many items in which foreign production costs are greatly lower than ours. Coffee and pulp plus paper head the list – each with $1 billion of free imports. We admit $300 million or more in free imports of three other items: crude rubber, iron ore and non-ferrous materials. We also admit duty-free $100 million or more of each of the following: sea fish, skins, cocoa, vegetable oils, silk, fuel oil, diamonds, ferroalloys, tin and fertilizer materials.

Observe: these items free of duty are raw or semi-manufactured articles. In finished manufactures, it is a great thing when we admit free of duty about $50 million of tractors or $25 million of typewriters. Our advertised manufacturing efficiency does not invite foreign competition.

We are prepared to buy other peoples' resources but not their labor. Even dairy produce pays 18 percent duty and vegetables 30 percent. On synthetic fibres and their manufactures – where we claim inventive leadership – our customs duties average 33 percent. On the dutiable coal-tar products of our great chemical industry, our tariffs average 31 percent. On clocks and watches, the average is 51 percent.

Canada and Venezuela supply the United States with raw materials, and they consequently each pay an average of only 3 percent duty on all their sales to us. Brazil pays only 1 percent. Great Britain and Western Germany are favored manufacturing suppliers; they each pay 12 percent duty. But Italy pays 18 percent, Japan 19 percent, Hongkong 23 percent and Switzerland 25 percent. Our barriers are highest against those who have nothing to sell except their skill and their work.

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Under more international trading, with reciprocally lower customs duties, the occupations in which the United States is competitively strong would expand. These are usually high wage, heavily-capitalized industries. Examples are machinery, chemicals and metals. The United States already exports annually about $7 billion of machinery, instruments and transportation equipment; we also export $1 3/4 billion of chemicals and $1 1/2 billion of metals. These are occupations in which the value of exports per worker may approximate $12,500.

On the other hand, many light industries, when less sheltered by tariffs, will give ground to foreign competition. (If some did not give ground, international trade would hardly be possible.) Usually these industries pay lower wages and are less heavily capitalized. The supplier who prevails in the market may be the previously handicapped exporter from Italy or Switzerland, Japan or Hongkong.

Among the competitively weak, we must include much of our agriculture. Today, we protect our meats, dairy products, vegetables and temperate fruits by customs duties characteristically ranging from 10 percent to 20 percent. And, in world farm markets, we have a hard time against Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina and Denmark. They are not technically more efficient, but their people are prepared to accept lower incomes in farming than ours. We find it necessary to give away part of our food exports and subsidize much of the rest. The United States gets less than $3,000 per worker for the farm products we sell abroad, and we subsidize the prices of these exports an average of about 25 percent.

The world sales position of our agriculture has also been weakened recently by the formation of the European Common Market. In the Common Market, the Western Europeans are expanding their own high-cost production of most temperate farm products, through price supports. They are raising barriers against all competitive farm imports – including ours. The Government of the United States has recently failed to induce the Common Market to desist from this path; there is little reason to believe present tactics will be more successful in the future.

More Work or Less?

The purpose of international trade is to economize labor (and also other costs of production). There is no economic sense in the international exchange of merchandise unless this trading constitutes a means to buy abroad a volume of merchandise which would take relatively more labor (and more of other costs) to produce at home. It is therefore most peculiar that the reciprocal liberalization of international trading should be advocated as a method of *increasing* employment.

What each nation does with the labor it saves from international trading is a quite independent question. The saved labor may be employed or unemployed. In the United States we have *every year* far greater cumulative additions to our labor supply than we could conceivably get *even once* from Trade Liberalization. We have a basic increment of about 2 percent each year, through the growth in the size of the population over age 14, from which the labor force is drawn. And additionally about 2 or 3 percent is added to our effective labor supply annually by the increase in man-hour productivity.

We have done a poor job of employing this growing labor power. There is no reason to believe we would do much better with the relatively small net increment of unemployed hands earned from more international trading. Indeed, because of the probable concentration of the unemployment profit from more international trading in some industries and regions, we might do worse than generally. But to discuss national employment in the United States with primary concentration on international trading is to let a very small tail wag a very big dog.

Nevertheless, the employment issue seems likely to be much to the fore in the general discussion of Trade Liberalization – and, from both sides, largely on specious grounds. During the Eisenhower Administration, it was common for official statements to say that exports were responsible for 4 million American jobs. On exuberant days, the figure was 5 million. On January 25, 1962, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics issued a report arguing that employment attributable to US exports was about 3.1 million. But, on the same day, President Kennedy surpassed all previous claimants. In his formal "Message On Trade," addressed to the Congress, the President stated: "Several hundred times as many workers owe their jobs directly or indirectly to exports as are in the small group – estimated to be less than one half of one percent of all workers –

COMING: *An essay by Louis J. Halle on the kinds of war that are obsolete*

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who might be adversely affected by a sharp increase in imports." Was it really necessary to say *several* hundred times? Only *two* hundred times one-half percent is already 100 percent! The President was saying – in effect, though loosely – that more than 100 percent of all American workers owe their jobs to exports, directly or indirectly. Here we attain a limit of fantasy where all other competitors are left breathless.

Those who drafted the President's Bill on Trade Liberalization (HR 9900) obviously took much more seriously the negative impact of customs reductions and import increases. The Bill devotes no less than 31 pages to "adjustment assistance" for those injured by imports. But it may perhaps be questioned whether the effectiveness of the assistance is in proportion to the length of the text.

To me, it seems the sound and valuable protection is in the one page the bill devotes to "staging requirements" (Sec. 243) rather than in the 31 pages devoted to "adjustment assistance." Under "staging requirements" it is provided – but perhaps with too many exceptions – that any reduction or elimination of customs duty shall not take effect more rapidly than in five equal annual installments. This provision might be strengthened. In cases of reduction of present very high (over 25 percent) duties to zero, the period for full duty elimination might be extended even to 8 or 10 years. Then the affected industry would be given all it can reasonably ask. If a customs duty needs to be lowered, in the national interest, adequate time for readjustment is the essence of what can reasonably be given the injured party.

The President's bill, on the other hand, concentrates its emphasis primarily on helping industry with "adjustment assistance" – through government-provided "technical assistance," loan guarantees and tax reliefs. But these measures of assistance would follow only after a Presidential finding of injury from imports – a finding which the President need not make. The President's administering agency would then have discretion to certify an "adjustment proposal" – a certification which the agency need not perform. The administering agency could then offer assistance – such assistance as it thought proper. Every determination of the President and his administering agency, in this long sequence, would be final and conclusive and not reviewable by any court. In the circumstances, this "adjustment assistance" seems unlikely to be expeditious or of substantial value. To my mind, the whole idea of "adjustment assistance" is a blind alley. The President's Trade Liberalization Bill would be improved if the whole 31 pages dealing with "adjustment assistance" were struck out. At best, the unemployment compensation provisions contain useful suggestions for general unemployment legislation. On the issue of "adjustment assistance" to labor, wise words were spoken, two days before the President's message, by Rep. Wilbur D. Mills. He said:

> "Why should a worker who is out of a job due to import competition be placed in a more favorable light (if that is to be done) than any worker who is unemployed due to cancellation of defense contracts, closing of defense installations, or technological advances? Does the fact that increased trade is a matter of national policy justify singling out this area for special treatment? Why are we more concerned with causation than with the realities of people out of work?"

It testifies to the maturity of his audience that Congressman Mills said the above (together with much more in equally good sense) before a meeting of the AFL-CIO, and was warmly applauded.

The Balance of Payments Constraint

A professor of economics who spent many years in the Federal Reserve system and in the national government said to me sardonically, early in 1961, "That balance of payments 'constraint' is certainly going like wildfire. That is the most useful 'constraint' that has been discovered in Washington or New York for some years."

In the United States today, the Gross National Product can rise perhaps $30 billion without increasing our merchandise imports by more than $1 billion. In the jargon of the economists, our national "propensity to import" is low. Given the mentality of our business and financial community, perhaps it is best for us to keep this propensity low.

If we were now operating at reasonably full employment, our Gross National Product might be $60 billion higher than it was in the fourth quarter of 1961. United States imports of merchandise would then probably be about $2 billion higher. The "income effect" abroad could not however be expected to increase our exports by the full $2 billion. A substantial fraction would emerge as an additional balance of payments deficit. Our public authorities would then be pressed, in substance, to cure the balance of payments deficit by stopping the economic expansion. The financial community would call for higher interest rates. Voices of conventional rectitude would demand curtailment of public expenditure. The tail wagging the dog, we would be pressed to forego $30 billion of national product to save $1 billion in balance of payments loss.

Such pressures are the greater because the United States has acquired the role of the world's banker, and

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we have international liabilities, payable on demand, far in excess of our immediate liquid international assets. These pressures would be still greater, and might arise more frequently, if we liberalized our trade and thereby raised our "propensity to import." And this is a case where, in the next years, the minus – when it occurs – is likely to be more important than the plus. A net increase of $2 billion in our exports will give us only the expansionary benefit of the added demand. But a net increase of $2 billion in our imports will produce also increased pressure for a contractionist monetary and fiscal policy, which may result in a much greater loss of employment and national output.

Our balance of payments "constraint" is the tighter, and more limiting, because of problems that grow distinctively out of our failure hitherto to reach a satisfactory readjustment of economic relations with Western Europe (including Great Britain). We deceive ourselves – or are dupes – with the story that we have a favorable balance of *trade* with Europe. Indeed we do. In the twelve months ending September 30, 1961, we exported to Western Europe some $2.9 billion more of merchandise than we imported. But, in the same twelve months, our balance of *payments* with Western Europe, including both merchandise and other items, was in deficit to the extent of $2.6 billion. During the year, Western Europe took almost exactly half of its surplus out in gold, and it accumulated the other half as dollar claims on the world's banker.

On the whole, during the year, the deficit with Western Europe grew worse – though irregularly. Our exports fell from quarter to quarter. It is an open secret in Washington that, with the consolidation of the European Common Market, importing from the United States is expected to decline further. The barriers are going up against farm imports. American coal is kept out by tight quotas. And industrial tariffs are being "averaged up." (For an example of "averaging up," both Germany and the United Kingdom have a zero tariff on aluminum, and they together bought $86 million of US aluminum exports. All the rest of Europe bought only $20 million worth from us, but by averaging up these duties of the small buyers, the Common Market reached a "common external tariff" of 10 percent on aluminum, which is probably prohibitive.)

Americans must reconcile themselves to the fact that Western Europeans do not lie awake nights worrying about the United States balance of payments deficit. The United States Government gives Western Europe about $1 billion a year in military supplies. So what? The United States Government spends additionally over $1 1/2 billion annually in Europe on military activities. Again, so what? No doubt, the Americans have their own reasons! We must not expect gratitude; nobody is grateful to the rich for their small kindnesses. And we cannot yet count on ready European participation in aid to the poorest countries in Asia, or Africa or Latin America. Let the rich Americans pay for their fancy charities!

Trade without Credit

Under these circumstances, strengthening the international monetary reserves of the United States is of importance. The United States does not need more gold. But we do need to know that the United States will not be confronted by lawful demands for gold, from foreign governments, in excess of our ability to supply. And, even more important, the United States must not be constrained to forego the greater economic object, full employment, for the sake of the lesser one, the conservation of gold reserves.

The consultations on strengthening international monetary reserves, which took place in 1961, were therefore of more than technical importance. The fruit of these consultations was, however, meagre. There emerged a most curious international agreement (in the form of an exchange of letters, dated December 15, 1961, between the French Minister of Finance and each of the nine other participants). Ambiguous in several places, this agreement is so carelessly done that, in at least one case (paragraph F), the official English text – though having equal legal status – is not an accurate translation of the French. The agreement provides ostensibly for an emergency fund of $6 billion. But, though this is a Fund in which the US pledges $2 billion, a United States request, as an applicant, can be rejected by members who pledge $1.6 billion plus one dollar! Moreover, the voting itself is of little importance; every member has an absolute veto regarding his own participation. Perhaps, therefore, it would be least misleading to say that there is no Fund at all but only a procedure of consultation; every member may, on his own judgment, withhold his own money.

Under liberalized trading, the United States needs – more than ever – a workable international reserve system. To be of value, such a system must satisfy two criteria. First, the reserve fund must be large, in relation to any reasonably foreseeable demand. Second, the resources of the reserve fund must be certainly available to a qualified applicant. The agreement reached in 1961 (and not yet ratified by the US Congress) does not satisfy either of these two criteria. It has indeed been argued, by reasonable people, that this 1961 agreement is better than nothing. But thoughtful consideration needs to be given to the alternative possibility that – by creating the illusion of a firm resort where none exists – this agreement is, in fact, worse than nothing.

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Algeria–Uncertain Peace

by Jean Daniel

Paris

It's strange. No one is rejoicing at the prospect of a cease-fire in Algeria. Indeed, the event seems to be given more weight abroad – in the United States, in England, or in Italy – than in France or Algeria. And yet, beyond any shadow of doubt, this is an event of great moment. After long drawn-out and extremely laborious negotiations between General de Gaulle's representatives and those of the Algerian National Liberation Front, the war which began on November 1, 1954, with the outbreak of the Algerian uprisings, is to be ended. A chain of seven fearful years links that fateful November with this momentous March, during the course of which France has undergone some 20-odd ministerial crises, one successful *coup d'état* (May 13, 1958), two abortive ones (January, 1960; April 1961), and a national, spiritual upheaval so far-reaching that the resulting divisiveness can only be compared with that created by the Dreyfus case, the Commune or Pétainism. The war induced a state of trauma in the French Army; the methods used (repression and torture) shocked the national conscience; and the effect on the young has been profoundly disturbing.

Seven years! Time enough, one can't help feeling, for France to finish off a colonial war and resign herself to decolonization. Wasn't the war in Indochina over in seven years? Except, however, for their identical duration, the comparison is faulty; there are almost no basic analogies between the two wars. At the outset of the conflict in Indochina, the Viet Minh was a party, an organization, a collective conscience thoroughly familiar to the general public. President Ho Chi Minh, General Giap, and their friends, having been trained in Paris and/or Moscow, had a revolutionary past and a popular image which was apparent even to such non-politically-minded men as General Leclerc.

In the case of Algeria, it was just the opposite: when the war broke out, the rebels were nobodies. Who, at that time, had ever heard of Ben Bella or Krim Belkacem? So far as France was concerned, there was no question of negotiating, or even holding discussions, with men who were apparently completely unrepresentative and who had even been repudiated by the traditional chiefs of Algerian nationalism, such as Messali Hadj or Ferhat Abbas. Doubtless these "nobodies" had decided to gamble on instigating a movement which they hoped would become the incarnation of all the obscure or unformulated aspirations of the Algerian people. They succeeded. The "nobodies" contrived to parlay total nothingness into total revolution.

The difference between the wars in Indochina and Algeria is basic. The coincidence of their identical duration cannot be attributed to the demise of French colonialism or to French impotence. The explanation lies rather in the rebels' need to destroy in Algeria the artificial structures imposed by 130 years of French domination for the purpose of achieving a state of apparent equilibrium – an "equilibrium" which was advantageous to the European population exclusively, and which at the same time anesthetized any effort on the part of the Algerian masses to pursue their just claims. It is essential that this be understood if one is to get at the roots of a problem which will undoubtedly prove one of the most complex and one of the most revealing of the 20th Century. It is no paradox to state that the war loosed by the FLN against France was at times of secondary importance. It can even be said that this seven-year struggle was, for the FLN, a tool for building a national self-awareness, an organizational mystique and a foundation for the future state.

Since 1830, when Marshal de Bourmont began negotiating with a Turkish oppressor for control of Algeria, France had followed a policy of breaking up the Algerian State, a policy made easier by the fact that an Algerian nation as such did not exist. However, in destroying the Algerian State, France with her own hands and against her own interest created a nation. In the beginning, there was a State without a nation; later, there evolved a nation without a State. This nation – Algeria – was a wavering and uncertain entity, still in search of its destiny; a nation stammering at first like an infant, coming to maturity on a wave of opposition, but still a nation which held forth the promise of unity for the humiliated, and which revived the prestige of Arabic and of the Moslem faith.

When the leaders who are today preparing to take over responsibility for the destiny of the Algerian people and set up the structure of a State, a nation and a fatherland – when these men resolved to subject their country to a chain reaction of violence, they held very few trump-cards, and their gamble may have appeared

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JEAN DANIEL, *Foreign Affairs Editor of* L'Express *and a uniquely well-informed authority on Franco-Algerian negotiations, dictated this article from a hospital in Paris, where he has been since he was wounded by French soldiers in Bizerte last July.*

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to be sheer madness. Not only was all the force of French colonialism lined up against them, but they had to contend with an élite which was divided against itself and with the apathy of the masses of their own people. Moreover, the reformist and liberal trend prevailing in France at the time of the Mendès-France government weakened their appeal. (This government had put an end to the war in Indochina, and had inaugurated the so-called "Carthaginian" policy in Tunisia. While receiving representatives of the Algerian Nationalist movements who came to warn him of the impending insurrection in Algeria undertaken by "irresponsible" elements, President Mendès-France pointed out that he couldn't do everything at once, and that first he had to get Parliament to accept the Franco-Tunisian agreements before he could turn his attention to the Algerian question.)

One may well ask who or what favored the cause of this handful of insurgent leaders. There are several answers. For one, the emancipation of Tunisia and Morocco fired nationalist fervor next door. Secondly, an immense portion of the territory of Algeria was completely under-administered and even virtually abandoned by France; insurgent groups had been formed among the farmers of the valleys and the mountains. Then there was the hope, long cherished, that constant pressure would bring the Messalists and their chief (who at that time enjoyed tremendous authority) into the FLN ranks. This hope was to prove false, as we now know; the internal struggle among the Algerians was atrocious. For every European who died in the seven-year war, at least 9 or 10 Moslems were killed. This does not necessarily mean that the Europeans massacred 10 times as many Moslems as the latter did the former (although this was, unfortunately, often the case). I am referring solely to those Moslems who were the victims of the FLN, and this is why I claim that in Algeria the *revolution* was at least as important as the so-called colonial war. The FLN, building itself gradually into an indisputable authority, proceeded to carry out purges which some revolutions have taken a quarter of a century to carry out. There was a time when there were more "traitors," more "collaborators," more "would-be assassins," more "lukewarm patriots and skeptics" – in short, more counter-revolutionary elements in Algeria – than there were men actually in the *maquis* and in cities supporting the *maquis*.

This is the situation which led the French parachutist officers, steeped in revolutionary war theories taken over from the victorious Viet Minh, to attempt their own experiment in psychological warfare, counter-espionage and divisive tactics. The experiment did in fact lead to a number of insurrections and uprisings. But in the end the officers found two adversaries lined up against them: the FLN, which had made great progress in foreign diplomacy; and (it cannot be denied) General de Gaulle himself.

The Role of de Gaulle

On this point, a most illuminating book has recently been published: *The Secret Documents on Algeria* ("Le Dossier Secret de l'Algérie"), by Mr. Claude Paillat, who was a friend of officers now affiliated with the Secret Army Organization. Mr. Paillat minutely chronicles all the various actions whereby General de Gaulle sabotaged the campaign of the French military headquarters in Algeria to divide the Algerian people. In this book, de Gaulle is described as the enemy, and as the ally of the FLN; and I am convinced that this will, at some future date, be proved true. This may upset our mental picture of de Gaulle, a man so reactionary in other ways, a man who bears so much responsibility for having permitted the events of May 13, 1958, to take place. Nevertheless, the fact remains: although de Gaulle may have opened the door to Fascism, he did, indisputably and from the outset, back the FLN as the winner; he preserved Ben Bella and his ministers, because he planned to make interlocutors of them; he steadfastly refused to make a Bao Dai of Messali, or of anyone else; he did everything to make it possible for the mass of the Moslems to come out into the streets and express themselves. The delay in negotiations can be explained by his attachment to a special concept of the settlement to be made, but not at all to opposition to the ineluctable process of decolonization.

It was always possible, of course, to say that the Algerian war would end simply because everything must end and, therefore, this war too would eventually play itself out. (Even M. Georges Bidault, before Mendès-France, thought of calling an international conference on Indochina.) The growing pressure of French public opinion can also be adduced as a powerful factor in bringing the war to a close. Or one may point to the unpopularity of the Algerian war outside France, and the attendant weakening of French prestige abroad. But none of these is truly convincing. All wars do eventually end, of course. Yet this usually occurs as a result of some disaster or series of disasters on one or the other side. Such is not the case in France, which is prosperous and dynamic and whose interest is about equally balanced between terminating the war and continuing it. As for the military headquarters in Algeria, if it were given a free hand there might easily be another four or five years of war. In short, there has been no second Dien Bien Phu. Such a disaster was not possible in Algeria, nor will it be for a long time to come. Unlike the Viet Minh in Indochina, the FLN does not fully control some considerable region; and this it

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would have to do, even to receive massive foreign aid from the East or elsewhere (we can now afford to consider such aid, since it would appear that there will be a long wait for it).

The Torpor of the Public

What of the pressure of public opinion? On this score, we are compelled in all honesty to admit that it was not exerted in any decisive fashion except, possibly in recent weeks, well after de Gaulle had made the decision to call off hostilities. Besides, such pressure would have been very substantially counteracted by opposing pressure from the Army. The truth is, so-called "public opinion" in France has long been dormant. It would be fair to say that for the past two years de Gaulle has sought in vain to awaken the public. When in his campaigns – often in a spirit of demagoguery – the President of the Republic spoke of peace in Algeria, the response was torpid. The Algerian war was causing fewer deaths to Europeans than were automobile accidents on French highways. FLN violence, which was seething in France against the Messalists and the police, made the FLN as unpopular then as the Secret Army is today. When people are prosperous, they detest violence. De Gaulle would have welcomed far more pressure from public opinion. He would have felt his hand strengthened had he been obliged to cater to groups other than the Army and the FLN. The latter, with its revolution as yet unfinished, could not associate itself with any kind of compromise, and the Army fiercely opposed any negotiation with the FLN. In view of these irreconciliable extremes, the forces of peace were virtually nonexistent. De Gaulle desired to provoke in both France and Algeria a situation which would bring pressure to bear on the Army and the FLN alike, causing both to give way and consent to negotiations which, he hoped, would lead to an Algerian government similar to those which have developed in Black Africa.

The course of events ran counter to his hopes. Deeply chagrined, exasperated by the unfathomable (to him) FLN military operation, de Gaulle, after 1959, attempted an outright military and diplomatic throttling of the FLN. This effort coincided with friendly overtures to the French chief of state from the Soviet Union which had hopes de Gaulle would break away from NATO. But the FLN stood firm. It did so for reasons of strategy and of internal necessity, and its course of action was vindicated by events. De Gaulle's deepest interest lies in playing an influential European, Atlantic and international role; consequently, his viewpoint gradually shifted from reformist neo-colonialism to total decolonization.

Today, General de Gaulle and the FLN have a single, common enemy: the Secret Army. The tactic of permitting the situation to deteriorate (which de Gaulle somewhat sadistically employed) has led to the explosive situation we now face. For the time being, it is impossible to enforce in Algeria any agreement concluded between France and the FLN, for the simple reason that French authority in Algeria cannot command its subordinates and can no longer maintain order among the Europeans. The Secret Army has organized European Algeria into a bastion of desperate fanatics: it has demonstrated that it is capable of resisting that which seems to threaten its existence. General Salan's organization has achieved success after the fashion of all terrorist movements: it inspires a fear which hitherto only the FLN had inspired; it has been able to obtain substantial financial backing; it creates unrest among groups which, although in a minority, are nonetheless effective agitators; and finally, it turns to its advantage all the denunciations of its enemies. All efforts to combat it make it appear that much stronger and more powerful. New hope is awakening among the Europeans that they may yet be able to stay in a French Algeria; a campaign is afoot to sell the idea that the FLN will be the Cuba of the Mediterranean and that the time is ripe to challenge de Gaulle; the flames of fear of the Arabs are being fanned; rumors are circulated that Israel is involved in the rebellion of the French Army; *etc.* In short, the one-time victim of the Viet Minh in Indochina is disposed to try its hand at revolution, following the FLN pattern and aping its methods.

But now, something new has changed everything: the olive branch has been extended, peace and cooperation announced. Up to this point, the Arabs had remained silent and withdrawn. They looked upon the struggle of the authorities against the Secret Army as a mere settling of accounts, and they wanted no part of it. Henceforth, a common cause will link the French and the Algerian people in combating those who seek to impose colonialism in Algeria and Fascism in France. Thus, the miracle of miracles will occur: the Secret Army will be responsible for cementing a cooperation undreamed-of after seven years of ruin and bloodshed.

One can hardly say that Algeria will enjoy peace in the true sense of the word. Rather, the struggle will be transformed and carried on within the framework of an indispensable reconciliation between those formerly colonized and their one-time colonizers. How far will this cooperation go? The answer is: it will depend on France and the West. Will the FLN be pushed to the point where, like Cuba, it will abandon neutralism and line up with the Soviet camp? Or will it be possible, on the contrary, for the Algerian revolution to flower freely? This is *the* question not only for Algeria but for the Mediterranean.

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Which Revolution for Brazil?

Quadros Returns to a Country in Chaos

by Louis L. Wiznitzer

Hundreds of column inches are devoted by the American press to Cuba. I don't say the reporting is reliable, but it's voluminous. In contrast, little is being written about a huge volcano – 47 times the size of Cuba – which is about to erupt. The volcano is Brazil. Within the past month, I have flown all over the country, talked with many Brazilian leaders (as a Brazilian, not an American), and I do not see how revolution in that country can be averted. The reasons for this are many, and they are embedded in what happened when Juscelino Kubitschek was President from 1955 to 1960.

Kubitschek, being no fool, saw as soon as he took office that the only item he could profitably sell the North Americans was Brazil's oil land. Yet the oil was untouchable. The slogan "the oil belongs to us" is deeply rooted in the subsoil of Brazilian opinion, and the slightest concession or give-away on this front would have meant political suicide. So, having nothing to peddle, Kubitschek invented something – Brasilia.

Together with friends (Sebastiao Pais de Almeida, Brazil's second richest man; former Minister of Finance Horatio Lafer; Spitzman-Jordan, a shrewd businessman, and Israel Pinheiro, a lawyer who became the first mayor of Brasilia) Kubitschek bought vast amounts of land in a desolate region of the country; he then unearthed in the Constitution an old, long-forgotten utopian project calling for the construction, at some future date, of a new capital in the geographical center of Brazil – and, fortuitously, at precisely the spot he and his friends owned.

Tens of millions of dollars were invested in what was to become the most formidable public-relations campaign ever known in Latin America. Full-page spreads on Brasilia were bought in *Life*, *Epoca*, *Paris-Match*. Hundreds of directors of newspapers, important correspondents, leading statesmen and politicians were invited to come and see for themselves – all expenses paid. Raymond Cartier of *Paris-Match* came several times. (The publisher of the same publication was granted special tax exemptions for his textile industries located in the south of Brazil.) Former Prime Minister Pinay, movie stars from Hollywood and Rome, hundreds of architects from all over the world came – again all expenses paid. New York's Mayor Robert Wagner, France's Minister of Culture Andre Malraux, Kim Novak – they all were flown to Brasilia. A capital city which should have been constructed over a period of 50 years under the supervision of a dozen architects was created in five years by two men, both friends of the President – Oscar Niemeyer and Lucio Costa.

The idea was fascinating, the dream seductive: Brazil, "land of the future," building its capital in the middle of a desert. Enormous investments were attracted from North America and Europe. High-priced concessions were sold off to international companies for installing the various services of Brasilia – telephone, electricity, transportation, gas, municipal sanitation and the building of roads and hotels.

But all the money needed to finance this mammoth "folly" (as it was called by Bruno Zeir, the highly respected Italian critic) did not come from outside. The sums required were supplied by the printing presses of the *Banco do Brasil*. Billions of new *cruzeiros* were pumped into circulation. The result? A museum of modern architecture, two dozen fantastically shaped skyscrapers – and not far away, miles of "*favelas*" or shantytowns where people exist in misery and filth, often without water, without transportation. Kubitschek himself lives in Rio de Janiero. The Supreme Court, the President and most of the ministries are usually in Rio. It will not be long before Brasilia is the world's largest ghost town. Meanwhile, Mr. Kubitschek has become one of the world's richest men, with a fortune in excess of $200 million. His friends have done well too: substantial sums have been salted away in the vaults of Swiss banks. A report within recent days in Brazil's most conservative newspaper, *Estado de Sao Paulo*, notes that Kubitschek – the one "responsible for the economic and financial crisis in which the country is drowning" – is still "free and at large," and adds: "In view of such facts, how can we avoid despairing."

In all this sordid history, one Brazilian institution has kept clean. It is the National Court of Accounts (*Tribunal de Contas da Uniao*), which is now assem-

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bling material for a white book to be called *Accounts of the President* [*i.e.*, Kubitschek] *of the Republic – 1960*. Some chapters have already been published by the *Diario Oficial*, and they make raw reading. Kubitschek's five years were "a succession of crimes against the national patrimony, an orgy of wasting public monies, with no operating controls, checks or interferences." Thirty-six billion *cruzeiros* were spent in 1960 for which there were no available credits or funds; approximately 100 billion *cruzeiros* have yet to be accounted for. In 1960 alone, the government spent three times more than was allowed for in the budget.

Stealing and corruption are widespread in Brazilian politics. The mayor of the industrial capital of Latin America, Sao Paulo, had the courage to say during a 1954 electoral campaign: "Yes, I steal, but I achieve." That same year, the Brazilian Congress, in a move unique in parliamentary history, decided to bribe itself collectively by voting a law authorizing every member of parliament to import a foreign car. The import of such cars was then strictly forbidden because of the dollar shortage; a Cadillac sold in Brazil for a 300 percent profit. This parliamentary largesse meant roughly a $5,000 profit for each Congressman. Out of disgust, in the municipal elections of 1958, 100,000 persons cast their vote for a hippopotamus from the local zoo.

The graft under Kubitschek made even the enterprises of Trujillo in the Dominican Republic seem modest. The only comparable situation is pre-Communist China. There, in 1936, a modest American diplomat in Shanghai, wrote: "Anyone can see that this cannot go on for more than 10 years." Likewise, during the Kubitschek years, the most simple-minded observer could see that Brazil was plunging toward an abyss.

"We Are a Poor Rich Country"

Half the population is illiterate. The masses live on $30 to $50 a month, and are expected to be happy with a diet of rice, black beans and bananas. The ruling oligarchy that runs Brazil as a *fazenda* (farm) has always excused its evasion of social issues with such remarks as "all the people want is samba and more samba." Only two blocks behind Rio's ultramodern marble skyscrapers facing the sea, and 10 minutes away from Sao Paolo's Chicago-like business section, people live as primitively as those in India or Africa. As was the case in China, a few thousand Brazilian landlords own 92 percent of the land.

It would take a book to describe all of the ills that have plagued Brazil's economy, based as it is entirely on coffee exports for dollar income and balanced precariously on the slightest change in the world price of coffee. We would have to describe the lopsided distribution of national wealth, the ways in which big business avoids paying taxes, how Brazilian businessmen speculate against their own currency (which they mistrust) by buying up all available dollars, every day, and sending their profits out of the country, thus contributing to a further decline of the *cruzeiro*. Since 1945, the economy has had almost uninterrupted inflation, and chronic depressions. As the *Jornal do Brazil* put it recently, "We are a poor rich country." Even the figures lie. In 1947, the gross national product was 140.3 billion *cruzeiros;* in 1959 it was 10 times more – 1.4 trillion. But, the value of the *cruzeiro* dropped to 20 percent of its original value during the same period! Within a few years, a 300 percent inflation has all but wiped out the middle class.

How many American journalists are telling this story? A highly responsible newspaper recently carried a dispatch on a new "agrarian reform" in Brazil that any informed Brazilian knows is a joke. There are reports such as that by a correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News* who, writing from Sao Paolo, only three weeks ago, suggested that what is going on can be explained by the fact that "several thousand Moscow-trained agents" have infiltrated the country, and that the so-called peasant leagues, organized by an avowed Communist, deputy Francisco Juliao . . . have been spreading to other parts of Brazil in their efforts to incite landless peasants to seize uncultivated lands belonging to large estates."

That is oversimplification in the extreme. The peasants of Brazil's miserable northeast region could respond in no other way but sympathetically to the radical appeals of Juliao, who is sometimes called Brazil's Fidel Castro. Francisco Juliao claims to be a socialist who wants to "combine the ideas of Christ, Buddha, Lincoln, Lenin, Mao Tse-tung and Fidel Castro." Having organized his "peasant leagues" in the northeast, he is now trying to organize leagues in other parts of Brazil and he threatens to march on the capital at the head of 20,000 peasants if serious land reforms are not soon introduced.

Francisco Juliao has visited Fidel Castro twice, Moscow twice and Peking once. His two daughters are presently studying in Moscow. Nevertheless, Juliao has little patience with Brazil's Communist Party which he considers "opportunistic and paying only lip service to radical reforms." As for the US, his motto is "*Cuba si, Yanqui si, Imperialismo no.*"

A ruined middle class, inflation, misery among the peasants – these are what have given rise to an authentic extreme leftwing movement whose power grows daily. Miguel Arais, the mayor of the important city of Recife that controls the northeast of Brazil, is by his own admission to the left of the Communists. President Goulart is almost a prisoner of the Communist-infiltrated "labor" party which he leads. His private secretary,

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Raul Ryff, is a card-carrying member of the Communist Party.

Governor Brizzola of the powerful southern state of Rio Grande do Sul, who last September held the Army in check and helped his brother-in-law, Vice President Goulart become President, has recently expropriated and handed over to squatters land owned by Uruguayans. And within the past few weeks he also nationalized the National Telephone Company of Rio Grande. And therein hangs a tale.

The Brazilian press reacted almost unanimously in strongly disapproving Brizzola's rash nationalization of the telephone company. Not only conservative but liberal papers like *Jornal do Brasil* and the left-of-center *Diario de Noticias* called the action untimely and demagogic. The same papers praised US Ambassador Lincoln Gordon's moderation, for Gordon had said that "a solution should be found, with Governor Brizzola's agreement and in a spirit of mutual understanding." Alas, the State Department quickly cut the ground out from under the Ambassador. A Department spokesman called the seizure "a step backward of the Alliance for Progress," which was immediately interpreted as uncalled-for interference in Brazilian domestic affairs and an attempt to blackmail Brazil. *Jornal do Brasil* on February 20 said that the Department spokesman had made Ambassador Gordon's position more difficult, irritated Brazilian public opinion and gave Governor Brizzola precisely the propaganda he needs for his election campaign. The same paper asked: "When will the US learn to treat us as an equal, and not as if we were another Caribbean country?"

But even if Ambassador Gordon had a free hand to deal with Brazilians as he felt wisest, what could he do? The national government is a makeshift. No one at the top is able to make decisions; so they are made below the top! The Governor of the state of Rio Grande acts on his own when he nationalizes privately owned companies, in spite of President Goulart's pleas that such radical action would frighten foreign investors, delay funds from the Alliance for Progress, and be most untimely since President Goulart is scheduled to visit Washington in April. The Governor of the powerful state of Minas Gerais has gone so far as to officially "break relations" with the central government. A wave of rightwing terrorism has been spreading throughout Brazil and has been traced back to another Governor – Carlos Lacerda of Guanabara (Rio de Janiero). But has any action been taken against Lacerda? No. For Lacerda has too many dossiers on Goulart, and other men in power. It was Lacerda who flew to Brasilia several days before Quadros' resignation as President last summer in order to blackmail him into giving 2.5 million *cruzeiros* a month to Lacerda's ailing newspaper, *Tribuna da Imprensa* (since sold), so as to "save the honor "of Lacerda's son, Sergie, the paper's editor. Quadros turned him down; subsequently Lacerda denounced Quadros' plans to assume dictatorial power. Governor Lacerda is now engaged in trying to sell some real estate, which belongs to the public (on the Avenida Chili in Rio) to private investors.

Quadros or Chaos

The Goulart government survives by making frantic concessions to disparate groups, on a day-to-day basis. In December, Goulart sent Congress a law which would practically erase the possibility of profits for foreign investors; he later "suspended" the law which only means that the law awaits Senate approval before becoming effective. Speaking to workers at one Rio plant, he advocates radical reforms; the next day, speaking to a businessmen's lunch, he says that Brazil needs foreign capital and especially friendship with the United States. After much hesitation, he accepted the invitation of President Kennedy to come to Washington; but he made up for that by giving Khrushchev's son-in-law a royal reception.

No one, not the President, not Prime Minister Tancredo Neves (who is soon to be replaced and is known to be financially in debt to President Goulart), not the Army, has any real power of decision. The parliamentary system has ceased to function. "The political system inaugurated by Joao Goulart was," as the *Diario de Noticias* said last month, "never anything but a comedy: a comedy, indeed, of bad political habits." And this is where Janio Quadros re-enters the scene.

For of only one thing can we be sure about Brazil: the vast majority of all classes, including many conservatives whom he deceived and offended, support Janio Quadros' return to power, preferring it to the present chaos. This man, whose popularity remains unchallenged, is a charismatic figure, a solitary, enigmatic, emotionally unbalanced man whom one Brazilian journalist describes as "somebody giving an imitation of Charlie Chaplin giving an imitation of Hitler." He is a friendless leader, a heavy drinker who spends hours in his private theater at Brasilia watching Westerns, a manic-depressive who in a moment of frustration tossed what was dearest to his heart out of the window when he resigned the Presidency; and he has two obsessions: power and sex. When asked, upon his return from a trip around the world before assuming the Presidency in 1961, which of the great men he had met – Nehru, Tito, Bourguiba, Nasser – had impressed him most, Quadros replied unhesitatingly, "Nasser," and added, "because he too is irresistible to women."

Notwithstanding his visit to Castro in Havana, his sending of emissaries to Francisco Juliao, his resumption of diplomatic relations between Brazil and all

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Communist countries except China, his placing of medals on the chests of Che Guevara of Cuba and Cosmonaut Gagarin of the Soviet Union, or his cordial messages to Khrushchev, Janio Quadros is not a radical. Quite the contrary. His bias is for conservative economic policies. During the seven months of his presidency his motto was "tighten the belt." He used his tremendous popularity to persuade the workers to accept a wage freeze for two years, something even de Gaulle could not shove down the throat of French unions. Far from being a leftwinger, Janio Quadros is the "strong man" of the ruined middle class which dreads the prospect of falling to the level of the workers and the peasants. His personal honesty up to now has been beyond reproach; but, as one Rio de Janeiro publisher says: "It is sad that the only honest Brazilian politician in 50 years is crazy." Crazy or not, having given up the highest political prize and gone on a tour of the Orient, Janio Quadros, from a ship 10,000 miles away, was able to keep Brazil in a mesmeric trance.

Now Quadros, amidst great fanfare, has returned to Brazil. What now? Will he run for a seat in the Senate, or will he throw in his lot with the radical Front of National Liberation and ride back to power on a revolutionary wave? There has never been such uncertainty as far as means are concerned, nor such certainty that somehow the man will be back in office before the end of the year.

"The Drums of Revolution"

I said that the vast majority of Brazilians support Quadros. That does not mean he is without enemies. Some are now trying to promote a *putsch* that would put in power a dictator such as Admiral Heck, Marechal Denys, Governor Lacerda or even Kubitschek. They would hope to do this under the slogan of "saving the country from subversion." But to succeed, they must have the backing of the military, and the Army is not united. Many younger officers have been infiltrated with leftist ideas. Moreover, a segment of the rightwing justly fears that a rightwing dictatorship would quickly provoke a counter-revolution which in turn would lead irrevocably to Communism. Thus, Vasco Leitao DaCunha, Brazil's new Ambassador to Moscow and former Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and a solid conservative), said last month that, "If Kubitschek became President again, I think I and my family will join the Communist Party and take to the woods."

While the rightist groups plot, throw bombs at student organizations and radical newspapers in the cities, and write anti-Communist slogans on the walls, the extreme Left is even busier. Francisco Juliao calls the government's project of land reform that has been submitted to the Congress "a phony" and he is probably right. At the same time Juliao accuses the Communist Party of secretly supporting the ambitions of Janio Quadros, who is a conservative. It is paradoxical, but not unusual. This would not be the first time in the past 40 years that, for reasons of convenience, the Communists had backed a conservative or even a neo-Fascist leader.

Neither would it be the first time that a radical movement came to power through revolution, in spite of the Communist Party. After the revolution, there is always time for the Communists to catch the bus they didn't drive and take it where they want. Castro's revolution was made without the support of the workers of Havana. The revolution in Brazil may not wait until the country becomes more industrialized and until a united proletariat "breaks its chains." Again, the parallel is with China. Before World War II, Brazil's Communist leader, Luis Carlos Prestes, led a "long march" for many months through inaccessible parts of Brazil, saving his troops from destruction in a manner not dissimilar to Mao Tse-tung's "long march." By the leftists, Prestes is still called *cavalheiro de esperanca* (the gentleman of hope).

When Janio Quadros became President last year, the alternative for Brazil was "quick evolution or revolution." That has changed. The problems of education, housing, transport, land reform, wages, inflation are of such a magnitude and urgency that the present parliamentary regime is utterly unable to cope with them. Now, the alternative is between two types of revolution. In the past 12 months, the masses of people have been made politically conscious and they will no longer be distracted by the prospect of a new, gay carnival. Only a gigantic, energetic, consistent and concentrated effort can begin to lift the country from its backwardness and corruption. "The drums of revolution," as a Brazilian Senator has just said, "are getting nearer."

In the very near future, Brazil will become either a second India (democratic socialism plus neutralism), or a second China (Communism plus anti-Americanism). Which course it takes will depend somewhat on the understanding and patience and aid the United States brings to a nation that is inevitably moving toward neutralism and socialism. If the growing measure of Brazilian socialism forces the Kennedy Administration to review or renege on its plans for economic assistance to Brazil under the Alliance for Progress, reformist elements in Brazil will only be pushed to further extremes. A repetition of US mistakes in China and in Cuba could easily, and sooner than one expects, leave the United States with only a Kubitschek presiding over some Brazilian island, while Francisco Juliao and Carlos Prestes plan their first communes and Five Year Plans on the mainland.

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Catholics and Our Schools

by Christopher Jencks

The President's request for massive federal appropriations ($2.1 billion spread over three years) to build classrooms and raise salaries in public elementary and secondary schools is again being fought by Southerners who fear it could become a club with which to force integration, Republicans who fear that it could lead to broad federal involvement in education policy-making, and Roman Catholics who fear that further improvements in public education may drive their privately-supported schools out of the highly competitive academic market. This coalition can muster about 240 votes in the House – as well as a majority on the Rules Committee – and the likelihood, therefore, is that Mr. Kennedy's request will be refused.

If the 40-odd votes sympathetic to the viewpoint of the Catholic hierarchy were to be cast for aid to education, the outcome might be different. Many of these are Northern urban votes, which would support any sort of school bill that did not offend the Church, *i.e.* a bill which helped build parochial classrooms too. But the Administration cannot compromise, for that would alienate more Congressional votes than it would attract. Must we therefore resign ourselves to the indefinite perpetuation of the present situation, in which local parsimony condemns millions of children to intellectual malnutrition? Is it beyond our ingenuity to develop a school finance formula which will assure every child, Catholic or Protestant, of both opportunity and encouragement to develop his mental powers? A brief review of past church-state compromises suggests that this is not really necessary.

Although there was an established church in nine of the 13 American colonies at the time of the Revolution, anti-clerical feeling appears to have been nearly as widespread in colonial America as in Jacobin France. These established churches rarely enrolled more than 10 percent of the total population in their respective states; the congregations were drawn largely from the rich and respectable. About five percent of the people belonged to disestablished churches. This left the great majority unchurched – though certainly not Godless.

The passage in 1791 of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution did little to alter this situation. It ordained that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Such a requirement meant, among other things, that Congress could not disestablish the state churches. Even today most church-state controversies are governed by state rather than federal law, although some uniformity has been imposed since 1934 when the Supreme Court ruled, in *Hamilton v Regents*, that the Fourteenth Amendment had extended the prohibitions of the First Amendment to the states.

In the Federalist period, however, when ultimate power lay with state legislatures elected under restricted suffrage, the ties between many states and "their" churches remained close. Only in the Jacksonian era, when the establishment in all its forms was largely overthrown, were the last state constitutions amended, and the churches of rich plantation owners and merchants put on an equal footing with those of the poorer settlers. The disestablishment of religion was not complete, however, even in that era. Church property, for example, was kept tax exempt, which meant that atheistic or agnostic taxpayers were assessed to provide churches with free police and fire protection, free roads, and so forth.

A more serious breach of the principle that America should have no establishment of religion came from the failure to disestablish the school systems which had traditionally been operated by the established church. It was widely held throughout the 19th Century that education was, by its nature, a quasi-religious activity which had to concern itself with moral and spiritual questions if it was to be of value. Logic would therefore seem to have prohibited the states from operating schools. Had religious freedom been the only consideration, a legislature concerned with public enlightenment would merely have provided tuition grants to help parents send their children to a private school, religious or otherwise as the parents preferred.

Practical considerations prevented this approach from taking hold. Instead, most states developed public school systems which were, in principle, without religious overtones. In practice, they reflected a kind of non-sectarian Protestantism which was prevalent among community leaders and members of school boards in the mid-19th Century. But Catholics, Jews, atheists, and even some doctrinally-minded Protestants opposed this development, and as immigration and secularization strengthened their hand, many state courts prohibited Bible readings, public prayers and similar rites, gradually pushing the schools away from denatured Protestantism into secular liberalism. The result was that by the end of the century state schools had, in effect, become bastions of an "all-Amer-

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ican" humanism in which church and God were lauded but matters of faith (*e.g.*, life after death) were treated as irrelevant, and matters of morality (*e.g.*, sex) were portrayed as social rather than spiritual problems.

Many who clung to more traditional, other-worldly faiths came to feel, and with some reason, that the schools were becoming an establishment of irreligion. Strong pressures developed for an accommodation of public secular education with clerical views. The courts, however, placed quite strict limits on how much sectarian religion could be injected into the curriculum. Back in the early part of the century Thomas Jefferson had proposed that the University of Virginia resolve the religious issue by providing each sect with campus facilities to train ministers and teach theology. A century later this scheme seemed unsatisfactory to most jurists. In 1948 the US Supreme Court ruled in *McCollum v Board of Education* that a school board could not allow a minister to give religious instruction in a tax-financed classroom. Only when faced with massive non-compliance to this order did the Court virtually back down in 1952, ruling in *Zorach v Clauson* that a school board could use tax-supported teachers to check attendance at church-supported classes outside the school, and that the board could require pupils not attending religious classes to be in school instead.

But even the *Zorach* decision left churches unable to control the relevant portions of the public school program. Many sects therefore continue to support private schools for their faithful. The most successful school founders are the Roman Catholics, who are forbidden under Canon Law 1374 to "attend non-Catholic, neutral or mixed schools, that is, those which are also open to non-Catholics." A bishop may grant a dispensation from this obligation, but he is not likely to do so if a parochial alternative is available. Today nearly 60 percent of all Catholic parishes have a church school, and nearly half the Catholic children in the country are enrolled in such schools.

Do Parochial Schools Make a Difference?

Whether these parochial schools have created (or perpetuated) a separate, non-secular culture or distinctive social outlook is difficult to say. A summary of research on this subject, by Peter and Alice Rossi in *Daedalus* (Spring, 1961), suggests that the impact of the schools may be overestimated by both the Catholic Church and its critics. In St. Augustine, Florida, for example, a survey of Catholic adults showed that 29 percent of the Catholic girls who attended parochial schools had married non-Catholics; only 33 percent of Catholic girls who attended public school married non-Catholics. Similarly, 19 percent of the Catholic boys who had attended public schools had married non-Catholics; parochial school attendance only reduced the proportion to 16 percent. Parochial schools don't seem to make St. Augustine Catholics endogamous. A parochial school education did, however, reduce their chances of missing Communion during Lent from one in three to one in five.

Another study of "Bay City," Massachusetts, asked Catholic workers whether they found the advice of the Church hierarchy "helpful" in making voting decisions. Parochial school graduates answered "yes" a third more often than did public school graduates. But in neither group did more than one out of four say that he or she was politically influenced by the clergy.

Apparently nobody has tried to compare the academic achievements of comparable Catholic students from public and parochial schools. There is some sociological evidence that parochial schools create a student culture in which conformity to adult demands is more valued than it is in public schools, and this culture probably means that more academic work gets done. This may produce a better-equipped college freshman; but it may also encourage the expectation that the college teacher will supply more answers than he should.

As millions of Catholics move to suburbia and adopt an upper-middle class style of life in which education becomes ever more important, the Church is hard pressed to levy tithes high enough to compete with the tax supported schools. Within a generation the parochial school system will probably have to get access to tax funds or else reduce the proportion of Catholic children whom it serves. (This could be done either by making admission to parochial school increasingly selective – which would give the parochial schools added academic status – or else by allowing Catholic elementary pupils to attend public school and return to the fold only during the secondary and college years.)

There is another possibility. At times, a financially-pressed parochial school has rented or sold its building to a local school board and then agreed to manage the school for a fixed fee. So long as this school is run according to the regulations laid down by the school board for other schools, the arrangement is presumably legal: in 1899 the Supreme Court ruled, in *Bradfield v Roberts*, that the government could contract with a Catholic hospital to treat charity patients, and this principle would appear to extend to any sort of public service so long as the rendering of the service is not tied to sectarian proselytizing. But in many instances the Catholic order under contract to the school board does not confine itself to secular activity. Religious services are usually held in the school building before classes start in the morning, and Catholics are required to arrive in time for these services; potential non-Catholic pupils are usually encouraged to enroll in other schools, both to preserve the all-Catholic purity

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advised by Canon Law and to forestall complaints about the intrusion of religion into school affairs; theology is often permitted to influence the teaching of "controversial" subjects like history and biology; prayers are often said in class.

If such practices were tested in federal court, they might very well be ruled illegal. But such a test is difficult to obtain, for in order to sue in federal court (and indeed in most state courts) the plaintiff must show some substantial wrong. Merely to show that his tax bill has been raised a few dollars for an expenditure of dubious legality is not enough. Probably the only way to get a court ruling on what anti-Catholic groups call "the captive schools" would be to bring a taxpayer's suit in one of the states which allows such litigation, and then to persuade the federal courts to rule on the merits of the case, without discussing the plaintiff's right to sue. Or perhaps the Courts might be persuaded to hear a parents' suit. Similar legal difficulties would beset any effort to test the constitutionality of federal grants or low interest loans for parochial school construction or operation. Unless, as Senator Morse has proposed, a provision allowing taxpayer's suits were deliberately inserted into legislation, the decision of Congress would probably be final.

But what should Congress decide? There are no solid legal precedents. In 1947 the Supreme Court ruled, in *Everson v Board of Education*, that a state or local school board could, if it wished, define school buses as a personal service to individual families, and provide them for children attending private as well as public schools – just as most police departments provide policemen at crosswalks in front of parochial as well as public schools. Similar reasoning persuaded Congress to provide free milk and lunches to all school children, regardless of where they enrolled. But it has not, and probably will not, persuade Congress to build classrooms wherever pupils happen to enroll, for classrooms, unlike buses and lunches, are designed to serve spiritual as well as material purposes.

If the *Everson* precedent sheds little light on the current controversy over construction grants and loans, the other often cited case, *Cochran v Board of Education*, is even more irrelevant. In this case the Louisiana courts ruled that under the Louisiana constitution the legislature could provide free textbooks to both public and parochial schools. The Federal Courts upheld this ruling in 1928, but since the First Amendment was not at that time thought to limit state legislation, and since it is now held to do so, the case has almost no value in determining what the Federal Courts might do about a free textbook law today, much less about construction.

Lacking a precedent, the conscientious Congressman must try to think the matter through from the beginning. His point of departure must, presumably, be the compulsory school attendance laws which require every child, no matter what his religion, to study certain secular academic subjects for a prescribed number of years. A child can fill this obligation in any school approved by the state, be it public or private, religious or secular. The state can take whatever measures it deems necessary to ensure that these schools provide adequate academic instruction. It can look at the physical facilities or the credentials of the teachers; it can study the course syllabus and the curriculum; it could if it wished give the students examinations to see what they had learned. Most states do very little along these lines, but that is their business; the power exists, as a corrollary of the power to require school attendance in the first place. Not only can the state set standards for academic instruction in schools which claim to meet the requirements of the compulsory attendance law, but it can also provide funds to help schools meet these standards, or to exceed them. If the state seeks to create an educated adult population it has not only a right but an interest in allocating tax revenues to improve the secular work of whatever schools it approves.

"Wholly Devoted to Man's Last End"

Yet no state actually does allocate funds to the parochial schools it approves, and the reason is not hard to find. Pope Pius XI wrote that, "There can be no true education which is not wholly devoted to man's last end." There can, in other words, be no facet of parochial school education which is wholly secular. A particular course or book may appear to serve only a secular purpose, but actually the seemingly secular parts of the parochial school program serve, or seek to serve, religious purposes. To put the problem in more practical terms, whenever there is a conflict between scholars and bishops about what should be taught, the bishops claim the last word; whenever the search for knowledge and the search for salvation appear to lead in different directions, salvation will be pursued.

Given these principles, and given the historical record of the parochial schools in the teaching of controversial subjects, state legislators just don't trust parochial schools to use state funds solely for public purposes. If, for example, the state gives a parochial school money to build a new classroom, it knows that this classroom will be used for religious as well as secular activities. Even if the parochial school agreed not to conduct religious instruction in the classroom, even if it agreed to drop prayers at the beginning of classes, even if it agreed to remove crucifixes and stop collecting money for Holy Days, could it possibly agree to eliminate Catholic doctrine from the instruction in secular subjects? If it were to do this it might as

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well let the children attend public school, concentrating the Church's resources on out-of-school religious instruction or non-educational public services. The point is simply this: nobody, including the present hierarchy, can predict in advance what use the Catholic Church will make of a building. But given the Church's historical record and its ideological commitments, it is reasonable to assume that it will, on occasion, use its facilities, no matter how financed, to propagate what it regards as the word of God. This might be avoided if the church schools agreed, as they do in some countries, to place control of the secular part of the curriculum in the hands of the state which pays for it. State inspectors would then make sure that priests and nuns were not using state-financed facilities to teach, for example, a Vatican version of history. But the American Catholic heirarchy has never offered state control of the secular curriculum in return for state finance. Instead, it has claimed that all subjects with secular titles (*e.g.* "English," or "Biology") *ipso facto* deserve state support, no matter how taught. No responsible legislator can accept this.

What Aid Can We Give?

But objections to building classrooms or providing operating subsidies do not apply to other forms of aid, in which adequate provision is made to ensure that tax funds will be used only for those purposes defined by legislators as essential to the general welfare. To build a parochial school physics laboratory with National Defense Education Act funds does not create an establishment of religion, for a physics laboratory, unlike a general purpose classroom, is almost certain to be used in ways that secular scholars would approve. To train a nun to teach reading in a federally-financed Summer Institute is not an establishment of religion either – indeed, it is taken for granted that clerics can legally attend free state universities. To provide up-to-date textbooks for parochial schools, or language teaching machines, or other facilities which can only, in the normal course of events, be used to promulgate secular academic learning, is hardly a breach of the First Amendment. It does nothing to make membership in one religion more attractive than another, or to make religion more attractive than irreligion. It does not involve spending the taxpayer's money to propagate religion, but confines expenditure to the secular enlightenment of Catholic children. Such appropriations are simply an extension of the principle, laid down in *Bradfield v Roberts*, that the state can employ any private group to perform secular services, no matter what the religious commitments of the group. (It should, however, be added that none of these grants can probably be made legally to those Catholic institutions which take Canon Law literally and refuse to admit non-Catholics. Such grants appear indistinguishable in principle from Southern state grants to private schools which admit only white pupils, and if one is barred by the Fourteenth Amendment so is the other.)

But while Congress *can* aid private as well as public schools in this way, it does not follow that it *must* do so. Still less does it follow, if Congress chooses to aid public schools in a manner which cannot legally be extended to church schools (such as building general-purpose classrooms), that refusal to extend similar aid to church schools threatens "religious freedom." The First Amendment guarantees "the free exercise of religion." But surely this does not mean the Church schools must be literally free of charge. The point of the First Amendment is that religious institutions are private institutions. And private institutions cost money – a fact which, as everyone will agree, often threatens their survival. But that does not give private institutions, religious or otherwise, any claim on the public purse. The state may, for purely practical secular reasons, decide to do its best to assure children in private religious schools a good education. But, given the existence of public schools, the state has no obligation to those in private schools, religious or secular. It is a parent's privilege not to send a child to public school. But it is not his privilege to claim a tax rebate if he acts in this way, or to demand an expense allowance to cover the schooling he prefers. His only recourse, like the childless, the anti-intellectual, and others who think they get no benefit from public education, is to work for a cut in the public school budget.

Considered in this light the important criteria for Federal aid to church schools appear to be, first, that the aid shall promote secular rather than spiritual objectives, and second, that the aid take a form in which Congress rather than the churches decides what is secular and what is spiritual. A conscientious Congressman can and should support larger appropriations to improve specific academic programs, to increase the supply of competent teachers, and to get the right pupils to the right teachers. This includes the National Defense Education Act, the Administration's new proposals to raise educational standards, the Vocational Education Act, and other legislation which benefits all kinds of schools. But he can only support subsidies for building classrooms or raising salaries if these are restricted to secular schools. Whether he should do so in these circumstances must depend on whether, in his judgment, the subsidies are essential to the national welfare, not on whether they would threaten the competitive position of the parochial schools. In all probability such subsidies are not essential – but that is another story.

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Delmore Schwartz – A Personal Appreciation

by Irving Howe

There are times when a reviewer ought to declare his bias plainly, and that is what I propose to do here. I cannot pretend to "objectivity" in writing about the work of Delmore Schwartz, for it has come to be a part of my experience, an imaginative incitement to that struggle for self-discovery by which one tries to remain alive. When I first came upon his poems and stories

Successful Love
by Delmore Schwartz
(Corinth; $4.50)

in the late thirties – those wry, depressed and insidiously clever evocations of the life of first and second generation Jews in New York – I felt a thrill of recognition. For not only did Schwartz's poems and stories reflect the qualities of that life with a comic intensity, they also helped one reach an emotional truce in relation to it. Sliding past the dangers of hate and sentimentalism which always beset writings on this subject, Schwartz's best work brought one to the very edge of the absurd, and there, almost as if ironic distance were a prerequisite for affection, one could find a certain half-peace in contemplating the world of one's youth.

At first glance a comedian of alienation, Schwartz also showed a gift for acceptance, a somewhat ambiguous reconcilement with the demands and depletions of common experience. Many writers have treated similar kinds of material, but even those, like Bellow and Malamud, whose fictions are more inclusive and substantial have not captured quite so keenly as has Schwartz the particular timbre, the tangled reverberations and complications of irony within irony, that once characterized Jewish life in America. And what gave Schwartz's work its distinction was that he avoided the pieties of both fathers and sons, established community and estranged intellectuals; he worked his way past their fixed perspective, unfolding still another nuance of reflection by which to complicate and even undercut his own ironies. His poems and stories rested on what is for our time the most secure of foundations: the tempered humaneness of self-doubt.

To read him in the late thirties and early forties was part of one's education, and though I knew that some of his stories were much better than others, that "In Dreams Begin Responsibilities" was a masterpiece while "A Bitter Farce" was too soft and flat, the impulse to judgment was never very strong in me. For I felt involved with the emotional needs and resistances that had apparently led to the composition of these stories, so much so that I seldom ventured the discriminations one might make concerning the work of a stranger. I assumed that, whatever the proportion of success to failure, the body of Schwartz's writing was important, and there I think I was right; though after a time I found to my surprise that in certain tough-spirited sections of the country it had become fashionable to sneer at Schwartz as a self-appointed spokesman for "New York alienation" and as a writer indulging his taste for self-pity.

The first of these complaints derived all too often from a narrow-spirited envy of the excitement people attribute to life in New York – and there *was* a time when that life beat with excitement. The second complaint was a piece of critical ineptitude, for while self-pity was one of Schwartz's recurrent themes and frequent temptations, he had the rare honesty to struggle with it out in the open and, thereby, in his best work to confront and transcend it. A good many other, less honest writers learn to mask their self-pity as heartiness or stoicism.

Nowhere else, to my knowledge, has the pathos and comic hopelessness of the conflict between immigrant families and intellectual sons been rendered so well as in Schwartz's early

Arts Require a City

The city is a dirty distance shining
And grows on the eye as Roman poets cursed it:
Busy, wasteful, cocky, and unkind,
A pustule of no grape-hung pastoral mind.

The way through vines is lyric, walled with leaves;
Lovers there need nothing but the need
To feel sun deepening to a bed of shade,
To sense the ripeness of the light they wade.

Not so in city streets where traders turn
Their corners sharply till the price is right;
Yet who but these city bankrupts, having squandered,
Mock-up green alleys where no pimp has pandered.

Streets travel change into waste of time;
But vines lead to a perfect sphere of self,
Though, when approached, they aridly withdraw
Beyond the city's last reforming law.

LEONARD E. NATHAN

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

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stories; nor has anyone else written so authoritatively, so very much from the "inside," about the later experience of those sons. Schwartz soon perfected, as does every original writer, a manner or style of his own: mockingly reflective, verbally awkward, full of ironic apothegms and burlesque sententiousness, wavering between self-comfort and self-attack, ready to take the risks of seeking through his narratives that fraction of wisdom which is all anyone can hope for these days. The tags and sayings that dot his early stories and poems – *America, America, a youthful author of promise, we carry our fathers on our backs, let your conscience be your bride, doesn't your father know what he is doing?* – these seemed like the joking emblems of the cultural predicaments shared by a whole generation.

In his stories Schwartz was seldom a mere fictional reporter or genre painter; he composed realistic fables with a minimum of emotional stress, in which the burden of meaning was carried by a twining narrative line, and in which the characters embodied possibilities of consciousness so troublesome that between their being and sense of being a guerrilla war was often in progress. Coming after the social fiction of the thirties, in which the author, panic-stricken by the claims of history, kept himself out of his fictions, Schwartz now put himself well to the forefront of his stories, appearing as the agent of reflexiveness, the voice of doubt, yearning and modulation.

In his lyrics, so deliberately awkward and anti-poetic – I sometimes felt that no one but a true New Yorker could appreciate the full comedy of their rhythms – one also found a poetry that spoke to the sense of prideful disenchantment felt by young people at the end of the thirties as they reckoned their legacy of intellectual trouble. In his limited way Schwartz was the poet of the historical moment quite as Auden was in England: two writers about as different as any two could be, yet each struggling, one with the courage of his chaos and the other with a yearning for new systems, to discover what could be made of "a diminishing thing." Schwartz taught his readers to accept the dignity of their self-consciousness.

In both stories and poems his tone was deflated, as if it were looking over its shoulder to see whether it was being followed by rhetoric. It seemed to be composed of several speech layers: the sing-song, slightly pompous intonations of Jewish immigrants educated in night-schools, the self-conscious affectionate mockery of that speech by American-born sons, its abstraction into the jargon of city intellectuals, and finally the whole body of this language flattened into a prose of uneasiness, an anti-rhetoric.

Schwartz's last book of stories, *The World Is a Wedding*, appeared in 1948. For some time both before and after its appearance he published very little, suffering apparently from that midjourney crisis which comes upon all serious writers when they must choose between the safety of self-repetition and the threat of a new beginning. Though not quite so good as his earlier work, the stories collected in *Successful Love* show that he chose the path of risk. Just as his recent poems represent a new development – a somewhat forced venture into lyric rhapsody over the renewed possibilities of life – so his recent stories leave the thirties behind and turn toward the properous confusion of post-war America.

Schwartz has always displayed a keen sense of social incongruity – a sense of how submission to public roles transforms us into creatures of absurdity and self-mockery – and now, in turning to the paradoxes of recent American life, he has a fine occasion for releasing his gift. He has also shown a strong, if unstable and disturbing, awareness of the sheer foolishness of existence, the radical ineptitude of the human creature, such as occasionally reminds one a trifle of Dostoevsky's use of buffoonery in order to release aggressiveness toward characters and readers. The *persona* of buffoonery, which goes perfectly well with a high and sophisticated intelligence, brings with it obvious dangers and Schwartz does not always overcome them; but it allows him, as well, the possibility of catching his audience off-guard, jabbing cleverly beneath its dignity, as if to remind us that we too are vain and weak and pompous.

Something new appears in his recent stories: a quizzical wonderment at the

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powers of the American innocent, the boy or girl born too late to know very much about the costs of history and, in the crazy-quilt world of mid-century America, supremely confident that he or she can reach success, goodness and fulfillment through a mere unfolding of personal charm. The theme of these stories might be described as the irrelevance and defeat of enlightenment: that enlightenment which cultivated persons now in their middle years fought so hard to acquire but which their children simply pass by, amiably indifferent to and even tolerant of their parents' earnest *gaucherie*.

"Successful Love," for example, is a story about a young American girl, child of nature and progress, who moves into rapid sexual experience and soon acquires an encyclopediac, nay, a paperback wisdom on the mysteries of sex. Her poor enlightened father is left gasping, "entirely lost in the terror and jungle of innocence." It is a story appropriate to the fifties, registering with sardonic good-humor the obsolescence of all persons able to remember as far back as Roosevelt's first or even second inauguration.

A similar theme is developed in "An American Fairy Tale," which records the odyssey of a bright young man eager to become a great composer but ending his career as a successful band leader, while his father, a retired businessman, becomes a celebrated painter of primitive abstractions. In an amusing reversal of roles, the father shouts to the son, "You have sold out to Tin Pan Alley. Why don't you be like Bela Bartok? Money is not everything . . ." And "for the first time in fifteen years" the son is silent: "He felt sure the world was coming to an end, or at least the world as he had known it."

The story which best captures the qualities of recent American life is "The Hartford Innocents." A college girl kidnaps a baby from her parents, noted liberals who have adopted the baby but have decided to turn it away upon being told it has a trace of Negro blood. Ferocious in her innocent determination to live by the proclaimed values of her parents, ready to defy college administration and probing senators who suspect a red plot, the girl brings an entire little world into a comic crisis; and the story ends with a very funny report by a member of the board of trustees in which all of Schwartz's gift for blending mimicry and reflection is put on display.

Some of the writing in *Successful Love* is drab and careless, for what is meant as a strategy of understatement has a way of slipping into mere flatness. In a few of the stories there is a sudden drop of energy at the end, and the action is left dangling and unresolved, as if Schwartz had become bored with his own inventions. But the book as a whole is the work of an important and gifted writer, whose voice is uniquely his own and through whose prose intelligence breaks like an irrepressible light.

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MOVIES

Masters New and Old

Two more films by Akira Kurosawa have been released here, and they are figurative mirror-images of each other. *The Hidden Fortress* is cinematically fine but thin in content; *The Lower Depths* is more substantial but clumsy on the screen.

The former is built on the old "journey" idea. In this case a defeated but proud general in medieval Japan has to escort his incognito princess and her remaining store of gold through enemy territory to safety. The version shown here was considerably condensed and could easily be expanded, one can see, simply by including more hazards and adventures. Kurosawa uses action like hues on a brush, shaded or enriched; he establishes characters swiftly; he has a sure eye for pictures that are lovely in themselves yet always advance the story. Though fundamentally there is little more in this film than thrills of the chase-picture level, there are plenty of them, and they are accomplished with a skill and taste that give fights and hair's-breadth escapes an extra dimension. The result is sheer pleasure.

The Hidden Fortress (Albex)
The Lower Depths
(Bleecker St. Cinema)
Harold Lloyd's World of Comedy
(Continental)

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This picture may have been made as a divertissement after works like *The Lower Depths*. The latter is, for a film director, nothing but a problem and, as this greatly gifted man shows, an insoluble one. It takes place in one room and just outside it; it has long stretches of dialogue which must prove static to many who understand the language, let alone to those who follow it through subtitles. Not all of Kurosawa's felicity with actors and with editing can make it live.

He has moved the Gorky play to Japan a hundred years ago but otherwise has not changed it much. Unlike his *Macbeth*, it is not a Japanese variation of the original idea with altered story and personae, it is merely a geographical transposition.

In any event, Gorky's play is pretty much dead wood now – a parade of miseries remote from our own and no longer meaningfully revealing about others, filled with half-timbered symbolic characters each of whom comes forward for a brief scene at regular intervals. It may once have been shattering naturalism, although it must always have suffered from what Tolstoy called its "psychological inventions"; but after 60 years its documentary elements are dated, and little else in the place, except an occasional passage like the Baron's last speech about the course of his life, is still affecting. Additionally, Kurosawa repeats the interpretation of Luka, the holy pilgrim, that Gorky always deplored. Luka is shown yet again as the bearer of the secret of inner peace and eternal life, but Gorky intended him as a cruel, selfish egotist deluding the wretched with false hope. (Satine was Gorky's hero.)

The cast is excellent, Kurosawa's camera pokes dexterously among the embers of the play but can raise little heat or fire; and because we know it is a transposed work, it lacks even the superficial informational interest of a Japanese work of the period. I shall remember it chiefly for Toshiro Mifune's performance as the amorous young thief. I had just seen him as the haughty general in *The Hidden Fortress* and remembered his bandit in *Rashomon*, his *Macbeth*, his false samurai in *The Seven Samurai*. In these two new films this magnificent young man shows further reaches of his art; implicitly chides those who think his teeth-baring performance in *Rashomon* was Mifune and not the bandit; and confirms that he is one of the most powerful, versatile, and magnetic actors ever to appear on the screen.

Talk about Good Old Days is usually a disguised lament for lost youth, but sometimes the talk is demonstrably true, as with records of past opera singers and with films of silent-picture comics. Harold Lloyd has made an anthology of some short and long sequences from a number of his films, equipped it with music and sound effects and commentary, and issued it as *Harold Lloyd's World of Comedy*; and it plunges us right back into some Good Old Days – a world of insane but flawless logic and of characters whose smallest reaction is large. Lloyd and his fellows looked at objects and actions, strained probability but not (often) possibility to bring about various combinations, and let an initial situation breed inevitable but surprising results. The sequence that starts with Harold's climbing the outside of a skyscraper has the virtuosity of a Tetrazzini record; you can't imagine how it can continue or finish, yet you know that anyone who was capable of beginning it *must* be able to finish it.

It is a very, very funny film. Children will laugh at it; adults will laugh and admire. The score sounds a bit heavy, the commentator reads aloud the titles that appear on the screen (for whom?), and they ought not to tell us again that the skyscraper sequence was done without process shots. (Then why does the background change?) But the collection is so delightful that it makes us ask: why a collection? Who not simply reissue the best Lloyd films with music and sound effects? Then we would get, among other things, the full flavor of

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
GENTLEMEN, IF YOU WILL, PLEASE TURN TO PP. 42 OF THE APPENDIX: WHITE PAPER NUMBER 6521, PAR. 14. DO YOU ALL HAVE IT?
RE RIVALRY - CIA VS. STATE? IS THAT IT, CHIEF?

YES. NOW, PIERRE. IF YOU WILL SUMMARIZE -
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SORRY I'M LATE, CHIEF. I WAS FINISHING UP A BOOK REVIEW.
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3-18


TRY TO BE PROMPT, CHESTER. THE REST OF US MANAGE TO GET OUR BOOK REVIEWS DONE ON OUR OWN TIME.
PSST, ARTHUR! WHAT'S THE PAGE?
PP. 42, PAR. 14


NOW THEN, THE PROBLEM IS THE IMPROVEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS BETWEEN OURSELVES AND RUSSIER, OURSELVES AND ASIER, AND (MORE DIFFICULT BECAUSE IT'S A CLOSED SOCIETY) OURSELVES AND CIA. YES, ED -
WELL, WE'VE HAD SOME SUCCESS IN TRACKING CIA'S ACTIVITIES BY MONITORING THE ENEMY'S RADIO ACCUSATIONS, CHIEF.


TRUE. HOWEVER, STATE TELLS ME IT FINDS IT INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATING TO RECOGNIZE A NEW GOVERNMENT IN THE MORNING ONLY TO HAVE CIA TRY TO OVERTHROW IT IN THE AFTERNOON. NOW, THAT'S SLOPPY.
IN TERMS OF LONG RANGE PLANNING CIA SHOULD, ON OCCASION, HAVE THE SAME FOREIGN POLICY AS STATE, WOULDN'T YOU SAY, CHIEF?


I'LL BUY THAT, WALT. TYPE UP A CLASSIFIED MEMO AND LEAK IT TO THE PRESS. NOW AFTER LUNCH I WANT TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE SITES FOR A FUTURE SERIES OF ATMOSPHERIC TESTS. I UNDERSTAND THAT SOMEBODY SUGGESTED HAVANA-
BON APPETIT, CHIEF

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the character he created: the eager, affectionate, non-physical man thrust into utterly physical situations, the hero with the blood of cowards in his veins. More! How about *Speedy*? It would do a lot for us all these days to see Harold once again save the franchise of the horse-car line by completing the run before the deadline.

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

THEATER

The Absurd and the Ridiculous

That the faddists and the fashionmongers have now begun to exploit the avant-garde drama is hardly the fault of Martin Esslin – but his recent book, *The Theatre of the Absurd*, has somehow partly determined the shape and content of this exploitation. Mr. Esslin's study of the modern experimental dramatists is undoubtedly an authentic contribution to knowledge. Informative, exhaustively researched, and bulging with useful facts, it has real value as an encyclopedic aid to scholars working in the field. Its influence on aspiring playwrights, playgoers, and cocktail party conversationalists, however, is bound to be less salutary. Though on one occasion (an analysis of Beckett) the book performs a genuine critical act, its critical judgments are often faulty, inflated, or misleading: Mr. Esslin praises Ionesco's worst work, overvalues Adamov, elaborates on an unending host of insignificant imitators, and tries to make Genet an important part of a tradition to which he does not belong. Furthermore, the disorganization of the book suggests that, if it was researched at leisure, it was written in haste; and much of the work is so mechanical that it seems to have been produced by a thinking machine. Mr. Esslin repeatedly refers to concepts like "the absurdity of the human condition" without ever convincing you that these concepts bear any relation to feelings; and his relentless catalogue of biographies, synopses, themes, and principles eventually creates the illusion in the reader's mind that every playwright is really the same person. Having theorized at length about this anti-theoretical drama, Mr. Esslin inadvertently reduces it to a formula – a manual of avant-garde dramaturgy, subject to imitation by every opportunistic scribbler. And though he frequently cautions us to regard each playwright as an inspired individual rather than just a figure in a movement, the effect of his exertions is to make us overwhelmingly conscious of the fashion – and a good deal less aware of the art.

The Theatre of the Absurd
by Martin Esslin
(Doubleday Anchor; $1.45)
The Theatre of the Absurd
Cherry Lane Theater
3 x 3 (Maidman Playhouse)
Oh, Dad, Poor Dad
Mamma's Hung You in the Closet and I'm Feelin' So Sad
(Phoenix Theater)

The repertory program at the Cherry Lane, also called *The Theatre of the Absurd*, is an attempt to capitalize both on the fashion and on Esslin's book, the faults of which it shares. Also produced in too great a hurry, it too lumps the major and the minor together without enough discrimination, while making bedfellows of dramatists who would not particularly enjoy each other's company. I suppose, if we must concern ourselves with movements, that Beckett's drama of the fallout shelter, *Endgame*, and Ionesco's assault on the planned society, *The Killer*, might be forced into the same program, though the latter is a tedious work; and Edward Albee's *The American Dream* is an accurate enough imitation of *The Bald Soprano* (additional characters and dialogue by T. Williams) to belong as well. But Genet's *Deathwatch* is totally *sui generis*; Albee's *The Zoo Story* is a compound of Genet, Williams, and Ginsberg; Richardson's *Gallows Humor* is descended from the French and German philosophical drama; and Arrabal's *Picnic on the Battlefield*, though it qualifies as

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an Absurdist play, does not qualify as art. Furthermore, most of the productions are warmed-over soup, having been offered by the same producers in the recent past; and though I did not return to all the shows I had already seen, the ones I did see were largely unsatisfactory. Alan Schneider's version of *Endgame* has been revived, suffering a little from *rigor mortis* and from Ben Piazza, who plays Clov with a Southwestern drawl and a Method shuffle (Vincent Gardenia's Hamm, however, while unfinished, is a moving performance); and Donald Davis' production of *Deathwatch* – also scuttled by Piazza who enacts Green Eyes like the juvenile lead in a TV series – is self-conscious, arty, awkward, and quite inferior to the version of a few seasons back.

To me, the most original American play on the program was also the most modest: a series of blackout sketches called *Bertha*, by Kenneth Koch. Mr. Koch – also represented by *George Washington Crossing the Delaware* in *3 x 3*, another (short-lived) program of experimental plays – has discovered an inexhaustible vein of dramatic material: the corpus of Western myth, historical anecdote, and fairy tale, all of which he mocks gently in the anachronistic accents of romantic verse drama. In *Bertha*, amusingly directed by Nicola Cernovich and played with cranky affection by Sudie Bond, he follows the wacky adventures of a mad Norwegian Queen, redolent of every heroic Queen in fact and fiction, as she overcomes the Barbarians, decapitates her Counselor ("Let Higher Learning be dis-reinstated!"), conquers Scotland, forbids (like Elizabeth I) lovers' garden meetings, and permits the Barbarians to triumph again so that she can reconquer them. In *George Washington*, he recreates, with the help of his director, Arthur Storch, a grammar school pageant – replete with tableaux, blank verse, and cardboard props. Cornwallis and his redcoats praise the manly bearing of the American commander ("his shoes have a high polish"); Washington's soldiers advance in whispers while offering each other tobacco in the tones of cigarette commercials; and, in a dream sequence, Washington conjures up six-year-old Georgie ("the little squint") chopping down the cherry tree and running like hell from his malevolent father: "I cannot tell a lie. But I can run. I can flee from injustice." With this ingenious scalpel, Koch not only cuts through the absurdities of a stiff American legend, but slices into the degenerative tissues of a corrupt society which still pays homage, mechanically, to the heroes it has become unworthy of.

With Arthur Kopit's *Oh Dad, Poor Dad*, the avant-garde fashion turns chi-chi. Jerome Robbins has obviously poured a fortune into his production, possibly to hide the thinness and immaturity of the play. But though the cash tinkles too loudly sometimes, let us be grateful for the things that money can buy. While Jo Van Fleet struggles to be flamboyant in a part (Madame Rosepettle) that is a little too rich for her naturalistic blood, Barbara Harris as a lecherous Betty Boop and Austin Pendleton as a stammering Mamma's boy are excellent acquisitions; and Mr. Robbins' imaginative use of props (spitting piranhas, collapsing furniture, animated flytraps) and of graphics (each scene is preceded by an elaborate movie credit, composed of surrealist montages) provide enough amusement to be worth the expense. As for the play – which Robbins has correctly directed like a cartoon – the final scene has a grisly humor, revolving as it does around a corpse which keeps falling on a girl while she is trying to make love; but the rest of the work is inadequate and derivative. Mr. Kopit shares with Broadway psychological playwrights an abiding distaste for mothers and potential mothers, expressed by displaying females in possessive, smothering, and emasculating attitudes. With Tennessee Williams, he evokes a predatory world populated by man-eating fish, man-eating plants, and man-eating women. And with a growing number of aspiring young dramatists, he has a tendency to ape the techniques of the avant-garde without adding anything original of his own. It is this desire to join a parade rather than to communicate a unique vision that tends to reduce the Absurd to the ridiculous. And though it offers excellent copy for journalists, it threatens to make the American Absurdist movement as arid a cultural phenomenon as the late, unlamented Generation of the Beats.

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